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INTRODUCTION

I

n the Doha trade negotiations round (“Doha Round”) at the Fifth
Session of the Ministerial Conference in Cancún (“Cancún Session”),1 the “Singapore Issues”2 were at the heart of the debate between
developed and developing countries, revealing deep differences over the
role of investment issues in trade negotiations and trade agreements.
Hence, the Cancún Session intensified skepticism about the feasibility of
achieving any compromise whatsoever in the near future.3 In fact, it was
only several years ago that the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”)4 failed to agree on the appropriate content of a multilateral agreement on investment (“MAI”).5
While the Doha Ministerial Declaration explicitly included the relationship between trade and investment in its agenda,6 reflecting optimism
for a potential compromise in North-South economic disputes, the decision adopted by the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) General Council on August 1, 2004 states that “investment issues will not form part of
1. The Fifth Session of the Doha Round took place in Cancún, Mexico, between
September 10 and 14, 2003. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Statement of 14
September 2003, WT/MIN(03)/20, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
minist_e/min03_e/min03_20_e.doc.
2. The so-called “Singapore Issues” in the Doha Ministerial Declaration are trade
and investment; interaction between trade and competition policy; transparency in government procurement; and trade facilitation. See World Trade Organization—Cancún
Fifth Ministerial Conference, Summary of 14 September 2003, http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/min03_14sept_e.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2009). See
also World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, ¶¶ 20–27, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist
_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.pdf [hereinafter Doha Ministerial Declaration]. This Article will
focus mainly on the relationship between trade and investment in the Doha negotiations.
3. See AARON COSBEY ET AL., INVESTMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 25
(2004), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment_invest_and_sd.pdf.
4. The OECD was founded in 1961 “to help its member countries to achieve sustainable economic growth and employment and to raise the standard of living in member
countries while maintaining financial stability—all this in order to contribute to the development of the world economy.” OECD, About OECD—History, http://www.oecd.
org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36761863_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2009).
5. On the failure of OECD negotiations on an MAI, see, for example, DAVID
HENDERSON, THE MAI AFFAIR: A STORY AND ITS LESSONS 20–32 (1999); Peter T. Muchlinski, The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Where Now?, 34
INT’L LAW. 1033, 1037–48 (2000); S. Zia-Zarifi, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Special Report, 9 Y.B. INT’L. ENV. L. 345 (1999). See also CHEN HUIPING, OECD’S
MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT: A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE (2002) (discussing
the various elements of the MAI draft).
6. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 2, ¶¶ 20–22.
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the Work Programme set out in that Declaration and therefore no work
towards negotiations on any of these issues will take place within the
WTO during the Doha Round.”7 This political and diplomatic concession
was necessary to bring the developed, developing, and emerging economies back to the trade negotiation table.8 This moment was a turning
point that enhanced hope for better diplomatic prospects.
We must therefore confront this question: what could serve as an alternative forum to the WTO for international investment regulation? A
number of potential forums were found inappropriate for purposes of an
MAI, and these are discussed at some length in Part I of this Article.9
The recent failure of the Cancún Session has forced the international
community to deal with investment regulation on unilateral, bilateral,
and regional dimensions. This raises afresh the question whether bilateral
and regional forums are, in fact, suitable for international investment
regulation. Although many scholars have creatively theorized ways of
integrating investment regulation into a future multilateral framework,10
an exploration of the legal and political environment needed for such
integration is beyond the scope of this Article. Rather, this Article will
focus on recent trends in the bilateral sphere.
As a result of the failure of multilateral negotiations, the number of bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”), free trade agreements (“FTAs”), and
regional trade agreements that include investment provisions has increased dramatically.11 Through their inclusion of most-favored-nation
(“MFN”) clauses,12 these agreements form a complex network that resembles a de facto multilateral agreement. Thanks to the MFN mechanism, developing countries are now able to sign such agreements with in7. General Council, Doha Work Programme, WT/L/579 (Aug. 1, 2004).
8. G8 RESEARCH GROUP, UNIV. OF TORONTO, SEA ISLAND FINAL COMPLIANCE
RESULTS: FINAL REPORT 56 (2005), available at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/
2004seaisland_final/2004_seaisland_final.pdf.
9. Several attempts to regulate international investment on the multilateral level
have failed. For a detailed discussion of these attempts in the International Trade Organization, OECD, and WTO, as well as a discussion of a potential World Investment Organization, see Jurgen Kurtz, A General Investment Agreement in the WTO? Lessons from
Chapter 11 of NAFTA and the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 23 U. PA. J.
INT’L ECON. L. 713 (2002).
10. See, e.g., id. at 779–88.
11. The number of BITs today exceeds 2200. See U.N. Conf. on Trade &
Dev. [UNCTAD], World Investment Report 2004: The Shift Towards Services, 221–31,
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2004 (2004) [hereinafter World Investment Report 2004];
UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003: FDI Policies for Development: National and
International Perspectives, 21, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2003 (2003) [hereinafter
World Investment Report 2003].
12. For an example of an MFN clause, see infra note 139 and accompanying text.
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ternational consent, something that cannot currently be achieved through
participation in the multilateral negotiation regime.13 Part II of this Article will examine this de facto multilateralism14 based on the content of
BITs, the BIT signing mechanism, and the case law that has arisen from
bilateral and regional agreements.
Furthermore, the new era of bilateralism brings formidable challenges
for shaping economic relationships between international investors and
developing countries, as the latter seek foreign investments that support
sustainable development values.15 In Part III, this Article will examine if
and how the new BITs should strike a balance between investment protection for multinational corporations (“MNCs”) and the enforcement of
corporate responsibility. I will assess how to advance these two objectives, addressing the ways that human rights and labor provisions counterbalance a broad protection of corporate investment. This issue is highly sensitive; it has played a key role in developing countries’ decisions to
reject investment agreements.16 It should be noted that the unprecedented
power of MNCs in the multilateral arena may be mitigated at the bilateral
level as a “humanized,” de facto MAI is developed.17 This Article concludes by analyzing various models for integrating corporate responsibility safeguards into BITs.
I. BILATERALISM: THE FORCE AGAINST MULTILATERALISM
Given its undeniable importance, foreign direct investment (“FDI”)18
would seem worthy of regulation by an international organization comparable to the WTO, which regulates international trade in goods.19 In13. See Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase
Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD DEV. 1567 (2005),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=616242.
14. The concept of de facto multilateralism presented in this Article refers to a multilateral practice resulting from the combined effect of bilateral relations in the absence of
an express multilateral agreement and not necessarily out of a sense of legal obligation.
15. See generally LUKE ERIC PETERSON, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND
DEVELOPMENT POLICY-MAKING (2004); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization and Economic Development: The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 36 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 514–25 (1998).
16. See Muchlinski, supra note 5, at 1046, 1048 (referring to disagreements over
labor and environmental standards as “deal breakers” contributing to the failure of the
MAI).
17. For a discussion of the potential for a “humanized” de facto MAI, see infra notes
320–24 and accompanying text.
18. See World Investment Report 2003, supra note 11, at 3–5.
19. The WTO is an international organization that supervises and liberalizes international trade through multilateral negotiations among its members. It was created on January 1, 1995 and replaced the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (“GATT”), which
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deed, some scholars have called for the establishment of just such an institution.20 However, host-investor agreements, a variety of national
laws, and a range of international and regional regimes presently govern
FDI.21 All of these regulatory structures create a competitive environment among States where FDI plays a crucial role.22 Moreover, such
competition has been intensified by States’ concession of some of their
domestic legislative power on account of trade blocks, multilateral
agreements, and the mobility of capital.23 In light of the existing tensions
among adverse regulatory powers, particularly between multilateral institutions and bilateral instruments in investment regulation, the role of
BITs is essential.24
Globalization, specifically the constant growth in FDI inflows and outflows that began in the 1960s and gained momentum in the 1990s, has
created a need for legal mechanisms that promote and protect foreign
investment.25 While treaties have been developed to regulate areas of
international economic law such as trade,26 evidently, no legal framework has addressed international investment regulation per se. There are
several reasons for this phenomenon. First, most international economic
activity has traditionally operated through trade rather than through investment, a state of affairs that existing legal instruments have perpetuated.27 However, recent developments (i.e., the increasingly pervasive
had served as a de facto international trade organization since 1948. See WORLD TRADE
ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO (2007), http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/what
is_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2009).
20. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, National Regulation of Multinational Enterprises: An Essay on Comity, Extraterritoriality, and Harmonization, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 5 (2003); Muchlinski, supra note 5, at 1050.
21. For an overview of the different levels of investment regulation, see Alfred Escher, Current Developments, Legal Challenges and Definition of FDI, in LEGAL ASPECTS
OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 1, 3–8 (Daniel D. Bradlow & Alfred Escher eds., 1999).
22. See generally THEODORE H. MORAN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (1998).
23. See generally Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 469, 499 (2000) (discussing the restrictive effect of the
current legal regime on the ability to regulate economic activity in the host State).
24. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and International Law, 42
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 123, 128 (2003).
25. For background on investment regulation on the bilateral level, see RUDOLF
DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (1995). See also
UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Mid-1990s, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7
(1998).
26. See, e.g., World Trade Organization, Legal Texts—A Summary of the Uruguay
Round, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#General (last visited Jan.
15, 2009).
27. See ROBERT HOWSE, REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 335–37 (1999).
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role of FDI) have departed from the status quo.28 Second, economic, political, and cultural barriers have impeded an appreciable number of markets from opening up to foreign investment, especially when such investment would have involved intervening in domestic firms’ decisionmaking.29 Countries at various stages of economic development have
been compelled to protect local economies, the domestic manufacturing
sector, and employees from the risks of foreign investments.30 In addition, countries have taken defensive measures to protect their national
currencies.31 Finally, with respect to investment promotion and protection, and dispute settlement issues, developed and developing countries
have been guided by divergent underlying values and were consequently
unable to develop legal tools based on mutual understanding.32
Over the past three decades, this picture has changed, primarily during
the 1990s, when foreign investment became a central aspect of the global
economy and effectively the principal engine of sustainable growth and
development.33 Eventually, developing countries enacted broad policy
changes, deregulating local industries and opening up these emerging
markets to foreign investors.34 Previous protective measures, such as performance requirements and limitations on transfers of currency, became
less common.35 Perhaps most importantly, developed and developing
countries began espousing similar values regarding core investmentrelated issues. An illustrative example of this confluence is the achieve28. See Escher, supra note 21, at 3.
29. For a detailed discussion of the relationships between such protection, and trade
and development, see THEODORE MORAN, THE IMPACT OF TRADE-RELATED INVESTMENT
MEASURES ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
(1991).
30. See id.
31. For example, some of these measures impose restrictions on the transfer of investments’ principal funds and returns, and force conditions on the conversion of foreign
exchange. See Duncan E. Williams, Note, Policy Perspectives on the Use of Capital Controls in Emerging Market Nations: Lessons From the Asian Financial Crisis and a Look
at the International Legal Regime, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 561, 570–90 (2001).
32. See Kurtz, supra note 9, at 718–23.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Host countries employ such measures to increase the local benefits of the foreign
investment in the host State, but their economic impact is questionable. However, the
Trade-Related Investment Measures Agreement prohibits such measures when they are
inconsistent with GATT provisions requiring national treatment and the elimination of
quantitative restriction provisions. Many Canadian and U.S. BITs also prohibit the formerly-common local content requirement. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV.,
WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2007: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES AND DEVELOPMENT at 168, U.N. Sales No. E.07.II.D.9 (2007).
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ment of a global consensus under customary international law on the
formula used to determine compensation for expropriation.36
While it was too early for multilateral negotiations at the time, investment exporter countries, widely known as “home countries,” found it
necessary to protect investors’ rights with BITs. “Host countries” were
generally regarded as open but unsafe environments for investment.37
Home countries were concerned about potential prejudicial practices,
such as arbitrary “access to markets,” discrimination among different
investors, expropriation of assets, and devaluation of investment values
due to regulatory changes.38 In contrast, host countries considered BITs a
necessary tool to attract foreign investors, a tool that would send positive, reassuring signals to the markets.39
These concurrent considerations triggered negotiation between home
and host countries with common economic interests, which led to the
signing of BITs as part of their foreign economic policies.40 Whereas in
theory BITs are reciprocal, they turned out to be rather single-sided.
First, BITs are typically agreements between developed and developing
countries, and the developed country usually initiates the negotiations.41
The economic disparity between the parties creates for the less developed
country a stronger interest in signing such an agreement.42 Second, the
developed country imposes the terms of the BIT on the developing country, usually in the form of a pre-structured draft known as a “model

36. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 397–403 (2002)
(discussing the Hull Rule in international economic law, which provides “prompt, adequate and effective compensation” in case of expropriation).
37. Id.
38. See Vandevelde, supra note 23, at 488–91.
39. But see Neumayer & Spess, supra note 13; Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct Investment? Only a Bit . . . and They
Could Bite (World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 3121, 2003), available at http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/09/23/000094946_03091
104060047/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf.
40. See, e.g., Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, F.R.G.-Bangl., May 6, 1981, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/
investment_bangladesh_germany.pdf; Agreement Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Malta-Fr., Aug. 11, 1976, 1080 U.N.T.S. 117.
41. Canada, for example, initiated BIT negotiations in 2008 with Tanzania, Madagascar,
Indonesia, and other developing countries. See Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Canada, Canada’s Foreign Investment and Protection Agreements (FIPAs), http://www.
international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/index.aspx
(last visited Feb. 6, 2009).
42. See Jason Webb Yackee, Conceputal Difficulties in the Empirical Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 405, 458 (2008).
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BIT.”43 Developing-country parties, in turn, have very limited, if any,
negotiating power.44 Consequently, most of the provisions in a BIT are
aligned with investors’ interests instead of the sovereignty of the developing country.45 Third, as will be discussed in Part II of this Article, the
enforcement part of BITs is centered in the investor-state dispute settlement provision, which allows investors to bring claims directly against a
host country in an international arbitral tribunal in response to a violation
of BIT obligations.46 Again, this mechanism mainly focuses on investors’
rights and nearly ignores investors’ obligations, thereby preserving the
dominance of investment interests in developed countries.47
Although the proposed International Trade Organization (“ITO”) facilitated negotiations on economic relations at Bretton Woods in 1944,48
the United States Congress refused to ratify the ITO Charter in 1950, and
the ITO was never established.49 Since the 1960s, when the BIT phenomenon began to develop steadily, international and multilateral forums
have attempted to negotiate investment rules without much success.50
The OECD, a collective of industrialized States, failed to regulate MNCs
both during the 1960s51 and in 1998, when MAI negotiations were held.52
In addition, the U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations failed
43. E.g., U.S. Trade Representative, 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_up
load_file847_6897.pdf [hereinafter 2004 U.S. Model BIT].
44. See Olivia Chung, Note, The Lopsided International Investment Law Regime and
Its Effect on the Future of Investor-State Arbitration, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 953, 958 (2007).
45. Vandevelde, supra note 15, at 514 (discussing the investment liberalization effect
of BITs).
46. See infra notes 265–75 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 288–90 and accompanying text.
48. The Bretton Woods Conference, held in July 1944, established multinational economic institutions to govern international economic relations in the post-World War II
era. In addition to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the Bretton
Woods negotiations discussed a proposed International Trade Organization to serve as
the multilateral forum for trade negotiations. Bretton Woods Project, What Are the Bretton Woods Institutions?, http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/item.shtml?x=320747 (last
visited Jan. 30, 2009).
49. See PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: TEXTS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 80 (2d ed. 2008).
50. See Lowenfeld, supra note 24, at 123–25.
51. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Draft
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, Oct. 12, 1967, O.E.C.D. No. 23081, 7
I.L.M. 117 (1968).
52. See OECD, Negotiating Group on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment
(MAI), Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Draft Consolidated Text, OECD Doc.
DAFFE/MAI(98)7/REV1 (Apr. 22, 1998), available at http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/
ng/ng987r1e.pdf.

2009]

THE FUTURE OF BITs

311

to agree on a code of conduct for MNCs,53 following several controversial resolutions reflecting the adverse views of developed and developing
countries.54
In light of these failures, the OECD was probably not the appropriate
forum for the development of an MAI. The breakdown of the negotiations begs the question: which alternative forum would be more suitable
for a renewed effort to create an MAI? The WTO has emerged as the
best-suited existing forum, mainly because it has addressed several issues
the OECD was ineffective in handling. First, the WTO has offered an
open stage for developed and developing countries, and even welcomed
nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”).55 Despite the harsh criticism
directed at the WTO, it was and still is considered a diversified forum for
international economic negotiations.56 It has facilitated an earnest NorthSouth discussion on investment issues.57
Second, in the WTO forum, investment has not been examined as a
stand-alone, but rather in the context of trade negotiations.58 As with other economic issues, a more cohesive approach towards international investment regulation has been adopted.59 As previously mentioned,60 the
53. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Transnat’l Corps., Intergovernmental Working Group on a Code of Conduct, Work Related to the Formulation of
a Code of Conduct, ¶ 22, U.N. ESCOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 9, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/92
(1981).
54. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (1974), for instance, did not
receive any support from the industrialized countries. See Detlev F. Vagts, International
Economic Law and the American Journal of International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 769,
780 (2006) (describing how the “capital-exporting states” responded to developing countries’ expansion of nationalization rights with bilateral investment treaties programs,
guarantees for their investors abroad, and threats to retaliate against expropriators).
55. According to Maura Blue Jeffords, writing in 2003, “More than 1,490 NGOs have
had some interaction with the WTO[,] most of which are from Europe and North America.” See Maura Blue Jeffords, Turning the Protester into a Partner for Development: The
Need for Effective Consultation Between the WTO and NGOs, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 937,
951 (2003).
56. This diversity of interests can be perceived as a representation of “cosmopolitics”
in the WTO. See Steve Charnovitz, WTO Cosmopolitics, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
299 (2002).
57. See Sylvia Ostry, The Uruguay Round North-South Grand Bargain: Implications
for Future Negotiations, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROBERT E. HUDEC 285 (Daniel L.M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002).
58. See, e.g., Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 2, ¶¶ 20–22.
59. See generally Sol Picciotto, Linkages in International Investment Regulation: The
Antinomies of the Draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON.
L. 731, 731–35 (1998).
60. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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strong linkage between trade and investment in the global economy has
created a rationale for adopting international investment rules under the
umbrella of a new, post-World War II international trade regime. Consequently, and under the leadership of the United States, developed countries made several attempts to include investment rules in multilateral
trade negotiations.61 Although efforts to incorporate comprehensive investment agreements in the Trade-Related Investment Measures Agreement (“TRIMs”) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(“GATS”) have generally been unsuccessful, TRIMs and GATS do contain a limited number of investment rules.62 Similarly, the Doha Round
brought the investment regulation agenda to the trade negotiation forum.63 The “golden age” of multinational investment, together with recent studies on the relationship between trends in investment and trade,64
have helped integrate negotiations on investment regulations with the
Doha Ministerial Declaration and with negotiations on a range of other
issues.65
Additionally, insofar as the Doha Round was declared the “development round,” investment regulation, an area that influences sustainable
development in a large number of markets, became a necessary part of
the Doha agenda.66 The trade and investment working group became
busier than ever; unfortunately, though, this did not last for long.67

61. See Lowenfeld, supra note 24, at 123–25. Despite several attempts to include
investment rules under the GATT jurisdiction as part of the Havana Charter, the GATT
did not include such rules. See LOWENFELD, supra note 36, at 103. Lowenfeld suggests
that the failures of such attempts resulted in the GATT maintaining its stability and
avoiding disagreements between East and West, South and North. See id.
62. See Kevin C. Kennedy, A WTO Agreement on Investment: A Solution in Search of
a Problem?, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 77, 100–40 (2003) (discussing investment rules
in the GATS and the TRIMs under the WTO regime).
63. The Doha Ministerial Declaration explicitly included investment in its agenda.
Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 2, ¶¶ 20–22.
64. For a detailed discussion of this linkage between trade and investment trends, see
generally World Investment Report 2004, supra note 11; World Investment Report 2003,
supra note 11.
65. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
66. On the Doha agenda as the “development round,” see Working Group on the
Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Report (2002) to the General Council,
WT/WGTI/6 (Dec. 9, 2002); Conference, Linking Trade and Sustainable Development,
18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1271 (2003).
67. See Kevin C. Kennedy, Foreign Direct Investment and Competition Policy at the
World Trade Organization, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 585, 602 (2001).
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In a dramatic shift, investment, along with agriculture, became the
deal-breakers of the Doha Round.68 Most commentators describe the negotiation of international investment regulation within trade forums as a
battle between developed and developing countries on the critical issue
of host-economy independence.69 The failure in Cancún suggests a more
complex picture. Hence, I will now briefly consider the new dynamic
that revealed itself at the Cancún Session, which ultimately obscured the
investment agenda and its potential implications.
First, the Cancún Session took place at a time when the political and
economic power of some WTO Members—certain developing countries
that have historically rejected MAIs—was on the rise.70 These States
used their new political status to promote their interests, shifting the focus of the negotiations to the European and American subsidies of domestic industries.71 Second, the proliferation of bilateral and regional
trade and investment agreements discussed above72 has encouraged developing countries to participate in this trend and negotiate bilaterally
and regionally, as their interests are less likely to be promoted on the
multilateral level, given the clout of the G-22 countries.73
Moreover, as the distinction between “free trade” and “fair trade” has
grown dramatically in recent years, developing countries have been successful in bringing real development concerns to the global arena.74 Yet,
as trade negotiations became increasingly complex, requiring challenging
adjustments by developing countries due to high levels of protective local legislation, simply renewing the entire WTO agenda seemed overwhelming; negotiation was thus restricted only to core traditional trade
issues.75

68. Tequila Sunset in Cancún, ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 2003 (addressing the failure of
the Cancún Summit in the context of the disagreements on the Singapore Issues).
69. See The Doha Round: The WTO Under Fire, ECONOMIST, Sept. 20, 2003, at 26.
70. This mainly refers to the G-22 group, led by Brazil, China, and India, which insisted upon ending negotiations over the Singapore Issues because of a lack of concessions on agricultural subsidies and import barriers on agricultural products by the developed side. See Mario E. Carranza, MERCOSUR, the Free Trade Area of the Americas,
and the Future of the U.S. Hegemony in Latin America, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1029,
1052 (2004).
71. Daniel Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey, WTO Talks Crash as Developing Nations Balk
at ‘Singapore Issues,’ 20 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1533 (Sept. 18, 2003).
72. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
73. Pruzin & Yerkey, supra note 71, at 1533.
74. Id.
75. In fact, the legal status of the Singapore Issues in the WTO was unclear from the
beginning of the negotiations. See id.
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II. THE NETWORK OF BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AS A DE
FACTO MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT
A. Bilateral Agreements and the Need for Coordination
I considered above the reasons for the Cancún Session negotiations’
failure, especially with respect to investment issues.76 Although the WTO
forum is more transparent and diversified than the OECD, and notwithstanding the fact that most disputes were resolved at the working-group
level and through bilateral negotiations that produced numerous signed
BITs, the delegations left Cancún without agreement on any issue, except
perhaps the agreement to abandon investment regulation in the Doha
Round.77
As developing countries and other emerging markets used the negotiations as a platform for again raising fundamental questions about distributive justice in international economic agreements, the issue of international investment regulation became a negotiation leveraging tool: the
United States and Europe were willing to consider reductions in agricultural subsidies in exchange for inaction on investment regulation.78 Thus,
developed countries agreed to table investment regulation in order to
keep alive the multilateral negotiations on trade.79
Has the absence of multilateral action on investment regulation since
the failure of the Doha Round encouraged countries to regulate investment unilaterally? Should it? Both questions can be answered in the negative. The pragmatic view, which was bolstered as a result of the Doha
Round, holds that countries prefer to coordinate investment regulation on
bilateral and regional levels.80 As aforementioned, there are currently
more than 2200 BITs that have been executed, and many more are being

76. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
77. See Doha Work Programme, supra note 7, ¶ 1(g) (stating that the Singapore Issues “will not form part of the Work Programme set out in . . . [the Doha Ministerial]
Declaration and therefore no work towards negotiations on any of these issues will take
place within the WTO during the Doha Round”).
78. See Pruzin & Yerkey, supra note 71, at 1533.
79. Id.
80. After the failure of the Cancún Session, even strong developed economies that
have traditionally regulated foreign investment unilaterally expanded their efforts to negotiate many new BITs, the United States being a prime example. For a description of
U.S. policy and a list of BITs signed by the United States, see Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, Trade Compliance Center, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Sectors/Investment/
Section_Index.html [hereinafter List of U.S. BITs] (last visited Jan. 16, 2009).
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negotiated.81 Moreover, even in the post-Cancún landscape, most arguments proposing regulation of FDI through multinational coordination
are compelling. Although home and host countries are traditionally seen
as having conflicting interests, globalization arguments suggest that these
interests are actually convergent to some extent, and recent economic
theories have reinforced this perspective.82 For instance, broad investment protection not only limits the power of the host government; it actually serves to enhance the availability of credit and the liquidity of assets in host markets.83 It is therefore in the host government’s interest to
comply with wide investment protection. Accordingly, most BITs express
the parties’ common goals in investment promotion and protection.84
Second, whereas customary international law is regularly used to construe investment protection provisions in expropriation cases, developed
and developing countries have had diverging views on related questions,
such as what kinds of investment a BIT should protect.85 Moreover,
MFN and national treatment have evolved into the main rights of foreign
investors under most BITs, whereas it is unclear whether these rights
apply to pre- and post-establishment of an investment in the same manner.86 Coordination on bilateral and regional levels, either through negotiations or regional centralization of the treaty interpretation process,
could provide answers to such questions and could help elucidate these
thorny legal concepts.

81. See UNCTAD, Quantitative Data on BITs and DTTs, http://www.unctad.org/
Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=3150&lang=1 (last visited Jan. 16, 2009) (providing
a chart and graph indicating that in 2002 there were 2181 BITs).
82. See Vandevelde, supra note 23, at 472–87.
83. See id. at 489–90.
84. See Calvin I. Hamilton & Paula I. Rochwerger, Trade and Investment: Foreign
Direct Investment Through Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties, 18 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1,
30 (2005).
85. For example, as a result of North American Free Trade Agreement case law, a
more limited definition of “investment” was recently adopted in the U.S.-Chile FTA,
which includes investment provisions in Chapter 10. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile,
ch. 10, June 6, 2003, 117 Stat. 909, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/
Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html [hereinafter U.S-Chile FTA].
86. While most host countries do provide those rights on a postestablishment basis,
several countries have concluded BITs that provide the rights even before the investment
has been established. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment, U.S.-Rwanda, Feb. 19, 2008, available at http://www.ustr.gov/
assets/Trade_Agreements/BIT/Rwa/asset_upload_file743_14523.pdf; Treaty Concerning
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Uru., Oct. 25, 2004,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/BIT/Uruguay/asset_upload_
file748_9005.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-Uruguay BIT].
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Finally, the dispute settlement mechanism of investment agreements
makes coordination on the bilateral level necessary. This mechanism allows private investors, as individuals, to bring claims against host governments before international arbitral tribunals based on alleged violations of a BIT.87 Without such provisions for dispute settlement, a BIT
would represent merely an abstract declaration of the importance of FDI
and its protection. The nonexistence of a forum for multilateral investment disputes underscores the fact that enforcement of investors’ rights
under international rules is not viable without the consent of both parties
to a bilateral dispute settlement mechanism.88
It is essential, though, to understand that a State’s enthusiasm for concluding bilateral agreements on the promotion and protection of international investments will never supersede the State’s will to regulate certain domestic industries unilaterally. Thus, most countries maintain their
security industries and relations with foreign markets, for example,
through unilateral regulation or through separate mutual understandings.89
B. The Multilateral Aspect of Bilateralism
At first glance, the bilateral dynamic previously discussed has little, if
anything, to do with multilateralism. In fact, bilateralism has been successful exactly where multilateralism has failed.90 Still, recent attempts to
regulate investment have raised the possibility of a future MAI and have

87. See GEORGIOS PETROCHILOS, PROCEDURAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
246–57 (2004).
88. Id. at 250.
89. For example, Israel, a State under constant military threat, concludes BITs that
exclude military and security industries from the wide protection of the treaties, including
MFN and national treatment rights; Israel effects its policy regarding national security
industries through bilateral security agreements and centralized local industry regulation.
See, e.g., Security Memorandum of Agreement, U.S.-Isr., Oct. 31, 1998, available at
http://www.aipac.org/Publications/SourceMaterialsU.S.IsraelBilateral/U.S._Israel_Securi
ty_memorandum.pdf. The centralized local defense industry is managed and supervised
by SIBAT, the Israeli Defense Ministry’s defense assistance division. SIBAT, About
Sibat, http://www.sibat.mod.gov.il/SibatMain/sibat/about/overview.htm (last visited Feb. 2,
2009). For an overview of Israel’s investment policy, see Efraim Chalamish, An Oasis in
the Desert: The Emergence of the Israeli Investment Treaties in the Global Economy
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript on file with Brooklyn Journal of International Law).
90. Cf. KATHERINE LYNCH, THE FORCES OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: CHALLENGES
TO THE REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 145–58 (2003) (discussing
the relative success of bilateralism through the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes).
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reinforced the importance of investment regulation as a bargaining chip
in international economic negotiations.91
We shall now examine what I describe as the “multilateral” aspect of
BITs. This concept has tremendous implications for the future of international economic law. For example, it could foreclose the development of
a multilateral agreement or render one redundant. Moreover, the multilateral dimension of bilateralism will enable arbitrators in investor-state
disputes to turn to comparable BITs as interpretative tools. It will also
justify the integration of corporate responsibility commitments into BITs,
in response to potential arguments against integration based on the lack
of a true MAI.
1. The Substance of BITs and Regulatory Competition
During the past century, political and economic movements have advanced through centralized structures, a national market in the United
States, a Common Market in the European Union,92 and a “global marketplace.”93 These movements have relied upon the assumption that different standards for products or production processes can block market
access for MNCs94 or constitute illegitimate comparative advantages95
(i.e., externalities or strategic choices), and thus, impede economic integration. Harmonization is considered the remedy for another undesirable
implication of FDI: a surge of foreign investment to low-standard jurisdictions.96 Such a development, which would further loosen regulatory
standards in many States, might create a so-called race to the bottom.97
91. See Kurtz, supra note 9, at 779–88.
92. The Common Market is the informal name for the European Economic Community (“EEC”), which was established in 1958 following the EEC treaty, signed in 1957.
The Common Market’s goal was to create an economic union, and subsequently a political union, through united economic policies, such as liberalization of the movement of
labor and capital. See generally Europa, SCADplus: Treaty Establishing the European
Economy Community, http://europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/eec_en.htm (last visited Feb. 2,
2009).
93. See David Schneiderman, Investment Rules and the New Constitutionalism, 25
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 757, 759 (2000).
94. But see ALAN O. SYKES, PRODUCT STANDARDS FOR INTERNATIONALLY INTEGRATED
GOODS AND MARKETS (1995) (contending that market pressures will produce an optimal
degree of harmonization with respect to product standards).
95. Comparative advantages might be legitimate if diverging production standards
were explained by different circumstances, such as geography or resources. Id.
96. See Alvin K. Klevorick, The Race to the Bottom in a Federal System: Lessons
from the World of Trade Policy, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 177 (1996) (discussing harmonization as a potential solution for the race to the bottom problem).
97. For a description of this competition in the environmental law context, see
DANIEL ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE FUTURE (1994).
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Notably, competition theorists are more open to government intervention
and harmonization of international regulation in scenarios that exhibit
externalities or other market failures than in scenarios that involve a race
to the bottom,98 as the latter tend to produce inconsistent empirical results and involve controversial normative arguments.99
Harmonization is not always a net-positive phenomenon. Regulatory
competition theory is concerned with government failure created by
harmonization and intervention, which can be more severe than market
failure.100 Thus, regulatory competition can establish a market in locational rights, allowing MNCs to quit inefficient or high-cost countries.101
Applying Tiebout’s classic model, competition among States provides an
MNC decision-maker with a range of locational preferences reflecting
different economic priorities.102 As a result, such competition also improves social welfare and encourages governmental efficiency.103
To assist legislators in regulating dissimilar legal regimes more effectively, a number of scholars have developed models based on the advantages of competition versus harmonization in international regulation.104
Since governmental failures and market failures tend to exhibit different
patterns in various legal disciplines, Professor Avi-Yonah, for example,
has examined each discipline separately.105 He divides these disciplines
based on two criteria: the consensus on the norms among States with a
need for extraterritoriality, and the extent to which the MNC community
supports or objects to the norms.106 The policy interests involved in applying extraterritorial regulations to MNCs—that is, comity or harmoni98. For an introduction to the race to the bottom concept, see supra notes 96–97 and
accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., WILLIAM BAUMOL & WALLACE OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY 7–154 (1988) (addressing the theory of externalities as it relates to market regulation).
100. Cf. Stavros Gadinis, The Politics of Competition in International Financial Regulation, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 447, 447–53 (2008) (introducing the concept of “regulatory
competition theory” with respect to the regulation of global financial markets).
101. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON.
416 (1956).
102. Cf. id. at 421 (describing a model for local, municipal expenditures, where, “[i]n
so far as there are a number of communities with similar revenue and expenditure patterns, the solution will approximate the ideal ‘market’ solution”).
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 20.
105. Avi-Yonah’s discussion of the applicability of national norms to international
entities clarifies the modalities of using harmonization and competition approaches in
international regulation. Id. at 8–13.
106. Id. at 10–13 (illustrating the interplay of these two factors using a matrix diagram).

2009]

THE FUTURE OF BITs

319

zation—should be determined using these criteria.107 Thus, when the
MNC community cannot readily achieve the consensus voluntarily, multilateral legal tools should force similar norms. As mentioned above, the
enforcement mechanisms of these legal tools are indispensable to the
maintenance of a stable harmonization environment.108
Bilateral treaties can play an important role in the evolution of international legal harmonization. Sometimes, however, BITs can have a disruptive effect, such as when regulatory competition results in a proliferation
of bilateral agreements with a panoply of different arrangements, frustrating the realization of a truly harmonized regime.109 Such disruption
is evident in international taxation, wherein harmful tax competition reduces tax rates and developing countries are forced to sacrifice tax revenues in order to join bilateral double-taxation treaties.110
Having considered the potential role of BITs in fostering harmonization, we turn now to an examination of the specific competitiveness factor of BITs in shaping the international legal environment of FDI. Competitiveness in this context refers to how investors use a BIT as a legal
tool to determine their preference for one legal regime at the expense of
another. Although there is an array of studies about how signing BITs
affects future potential inflows of investments, such scholarship has not
adequately considered various elements of the treaties and the treatymaking process.111
In short, the competitiveness factor of BITs is relatively insignificant.
BITs differ based on two principal elements: the level of protection the
host State affords to foreign investors, and the level of enforcement the
host State undertakes.112 A host State can offer potential investors a more
favorable investment environment by agreeing to a BIT that protects investors more extensively than other BITs. Including more investors un107. Id. at 13–31.
108. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
109. For example, as discussed later in this Article, the MFN principle has various
incarnations in different BITs, which create some confusion as to how this principle is to
be applied in a specific set of circumstances.
110. See Tsilly Dagan, The Costs of International Tax Cooperation, in THE WELFARE
STATE, GLOBALIZATION, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 49–78 (Eyal Benvenisti & Georg
Nolte eds., 2004) (analyzing the role of bilateral treaties in the complex scheme of international taxation).
111. See Hallward-Driemeier, supra note 39.
112. Investors’ protection is executed through the substantive rights of the treaty,
mainly MFN, national, and fair and equitable treatment. The procedural rights of the
treaty provide investors with the opportunity to enforce their direct claims against the
host State in the event of any violation of substantive rights. See PETROCHILOS, supra
note 87, at 246–57.
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der the BIT’s protection, expanding the scope of protected investments,
or granting more rights to investors can all help to provide broader protection. Yet, a close examination reveals that States do not actually use
BITs to compete among themselves in investor protection.
Most model BITs use similar definitions to identify the investors or investments covered by the treaty.113 When new financial instruments (e.g.,
derivatives) are recognized as a common tool of FDI, all BIT models
typically incorporate them uniformly.114 Similarly, model BITs also afford the same set of limited rights: MFN status, national treatment, fair
and equitable treatment of investors, and compensation for expropriation
based on the customary international law formula of “prompt, adequate,
and effective compensation.”115
In recent legal and economic literature, some have called for the inclusion of investment incentive regulation within international legal agreements.116 The need for incentive regulation comes from the race to the
bottom theory, which suggests that competition for FDI among States,
especially among developing countries, causes a degradation of labor,
environmental, and human rights standards.117 Hence, a significant reduction in tax rates by a developing country to attract foreign investors
might damage the public fisc of the host State, making tax coordination
among developing countries an absolute necessity.118 Nevertheless, most
BITs have not yet incorporated incentive regulation, and it would be an
ambitious goal at the bilateral level, considering States’ reluctance to
bear the costs of high-standard regulation.119 As long as BITs continue to
follow current models, it is difficult to understand how BITs will facilitate lawmaking competition that would create new rights or obligations.

113. Most BITs include definitions of the following: “investment,” “investor,” “person,” and “host State.” See Gabriel Bottini, Indirect Claims Under the ICSID Convention,
29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 563, 618 (2008).
114. See, e.g., 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 43, art. 1 (including “futures, options,
and other derivatives” in the definition of “investment”).
115. See, e.g., id. art. 6(1)(c).
116. See Japan Grows Positive on Bilateral Investment Treaties, JAPAN ECON. REV.,
Feb. 15, 2004, at 3 (proposing inclusion of investment-incentive regulation in Japanese
investment treaties).
117. See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining
the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 688 (1998) (concluding, after a comprehensive analysis of the race to the bottom phenomenon, that the
least developed countries should act as a group instead of competing against each other as
individual States).
118. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis
of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573 (2000).
119. See id.
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In terms of dispute settlement, BITs could differ—and therefore compete—by providing for various enforcement mechanisms, including the
currently prevalent forum, the international arbitral tribunal. In theory,
BITs could take divergent positions on core issues in investment arbitration, such as jurisdiction, privilege, confidentiality, and place of arbitration. Indeed, some model agreements already reflect such differences.120
For the most part, however, BITs take very similar positions on dispute
settlement questions.121 This can be explained by an international consensus on dispute settlement norms, a proliferation of international agreements accompanied by reciprocal influences, and attempts to create an
international jurisprudence for international investment law, notwithstanding that such jurisprudence is developed by numerous ad hoc international tribunals.122 This analysis reinforces the view that the substance
of the treaties, along with their lack of differentiation and competitiveness,
strengthens BITs’ role as an investment regulatory regime on a multilateral, not just a bilateral, level.
2. The Signing Mechanism
BITs have traditionally been negotiated between developed and developing countries, and this has an interesting impact on the design and
signing mechanism of these treaties. It has been common for the developed country to require its developing-country counterpart to sign a BIT
to protect its own investors’ interests as part of an attractive economic
package,123 which usually includes other economic agreements that appeal to the developing country.124 In view of the marginal economic im120. For example, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT offers the possibility of a bilateral appellate mechanism. 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 43, Annex D (“Within three years
after the date of entry into force of this Treaty, the Parties shall consider whether to establish a bilateral appellate body or similar mechanism to review awards rendered under
Article 34 in arbitrations commenced after they establish the appellate body or similar
mechanism.”).
121. See Jason Webb Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment,
and the Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 42
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 805, 805 (2008).
122. For a discussion of the development of investor-state jurisprudence, see infra Part
II.D.
123. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, United States, Uruguay Sign
Bilateral Investment Treaty (Oct. 24, 2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_
Library/Press_Releases/2004/October/United_States,_Uruguay_Sign_Bilateral_Investment
_Treaty.html (“U.S. BITs . . . ensure that U.S. investors are protected when they establish
businesses in other countries.”). This U.S.-Uruguay BIT was the first to be concluded
based on the 2004 U.S. Model BIT. Id.
124. These agreements can include double-taxation treaties, research and development
treaties, and economic cooperation arrangements. See UNCTAD, Quantitative Data on
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portance of some BITs, parties to such treaties use them mainly to enhance diplomatic relations.125 As a result, developing countries largely
lack the ability to negotiate provisions of approved models, that is, models drafted and signed in advance by developed States.126
Nowadays, intergovernmental institutions and international organizations play an important role in defining the need for BITs and in bringing
parties to negotiate them. The United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (“UNCTAD”) and the World Bank, the main players in
this field, actively initiate negotiations on BITs and then monitor the
process from their inception to the signing stage.127 Both institutions envision a desirable form for the BIT text and its implementation, and thus
work towards a consistent policy in all stages of the negotiations.128 Although they can recommend adjusting the text to the specific circumstances affecting the States involved, they tend to promote near-identical
drafts. Therefore, they effectively function as centralized institutions that
transform the network of BITs into a de facto multilateral agreement.
Thus far, these institutions have yet to receive the appropriate mandate
to promote an MAI.129 However, they can currently promote suprana-

Bilateral Investment Treaties and Double Taxation Treaties, http://www.unctad.org/Temp
lates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=3150&lang=1 (last visited Feb. 2, 2009).
125. For example, Israel signed a BIT with Mongolia in 2003 as part of its efforts to
begin active diplomatic relations. See Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Isr.-Mong., Nov. 25, 2003, available at http://www.financeisrael.
mof.gov.il/FinanceIsrael/Docs/En/InternationalAgreements/POI/MongoliaPoI.pdf.
126. The 2004 U.S. Model BIT, for example, was approved by the U.S. Department of
State (“State Department”) and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”), as
they share responsibility for the BIT program. The State Department and the USTR “consulted their respective advisory committees and relevant congressional committees” in
the process of developing the new model BIT. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Sectors/Invest
ment/Model_BIT/Section_Index.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2009).
127. See Gabriel Egli, Don’t Get Bit: Addressing ICSID’s Inconsistent Application of
Most-Favored-Nation Clauses to Dispute Resolution Provisions, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 1045,
1058–59 (2007); UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements, http://www.unctad.org/
Templates/Startpage.asp?intItemID=2310&lang=1&mode=more (last visited Jan. 16, 2009).
128. In response to the Bangkok mandate, UNCTAD developed a special technical
cooperation program that seeks to help developing countries in this respect. This program
was adapted and expanded to reflect the needs of member countries in light of the Doha
mandate, and subsequently implemented in close collaboration with the WTO. The Work
Programme on International Investment Agreements principally encompasses policy
research and human resources capacity-building, with a view towards consensusbuilding. See UNCTAD, Progress Report on Work Undertaken on UNCTAD’s Work
Programme on International Investment Agreement, 3–11, UNCTAD/ITE/Misc.58 (2002).
129. On the failure of the MAI, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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tional goals through the network of BITs.130 UNCTAD, for example, facilitates BITs primarily for the developing world, balancing the interests
of MNCs with principles of international law such as sovereignty.131
UNCTAD thereby furthers its mission to assure that the developing
world receives its fair share in the economic benefits of globalization.132
The World Bank also plays a key role in facilitating the enforcement of
BITs by hosting a leading dispute settlement body, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”).133 The primary purpose of the ICSID is to provide a forum for the conciliation and arbitration of international investment disputes.134 The World Bank offers loans
to developing countries to encourage production and development, thereby fostering international investment by the private sector. Thus, investment protection is a natural and essential element of the World
Bank’s agenda.135
3. The Most-Favored-Nation Principle and Harmonization in BITs
As we have seen, international investment agreements tend to contain
similar provisions on rights and obligations as a result of the extensive
involvement of international organizations such as UNCTAD, and the
power dynamics of negotiations between developed and developing
countries.136 In fact, BITs signed by countries from the same region that
frequently experience similar macroeconomic conditions often share
130. The fact that UNCTAD is not as multilateral a forum as the WTO allows it to
focus on bilateral and regional arrangements. See UNCTAD, Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Impact on Investment Rulemaking, UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2007/3 (2007) [hereinafter Investor-State Dispute Settlement]. The WTO, as a more comprehensive multilateral forum, may find engagement in bilateral or regional efforts more difficult due to its
commitment to wide-reaching, multilateral goals.
131. See id.
132. UNCTAD, About UNCTAD, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItem
ID=1530&lang=1 (last visited Jan. 7, 2009) (“[UNCTAD] promotes the developmentfriendly integration of developing countries into the world economy. UNCTAD has progressively evolved into an authoritative knowledge-based institution whose work aims to
help shape current policy debates and thinking on development, with a particular focus on
ensuring that domestic policies and international action are mutually supportive in bringing about sustainable development.”).
133. See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, About ICSID,
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=Show
Home&pageName=AboutICSID_Home (last visited Jan. 16, 2009).
134. Id.
135. In fact, in its early days, the World Bank mediated investment disputes as a neutral party. See David Sedlak, ICSID’s Resurgence in International Investment Arbitration: Can the Momentum Hold?, 23 PENN. ST. INT’L. L. REV. 147, 160 (2004).
136. See Chung, supra note 44, at 956–59.
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identical texts.137 Moreover, developing countries’ new approach favoring investment liberalization has reshaped their views on investment
promotion and protection. This approach has led to the adoption of similar investment protection provisions and international law formulas,
which stipulate the extent and type of compensation in the event of expropriation.138 Next, I explore one such provision in investment agreements—the MFN principle and its role in harmonizing international investment regulation.
The MFN clause is one of the most salient provisions of investment
protection agreements. Originally developed in trade agreements, the
MFN principle prevents a host State from discriminating among different
investors of different nationalities.139 Where a host country has signed a
more favorable BIT with another country, an investor from a third country is entitled to an equal level of investment protection.140
Since MFN treatment has become one of the most effective and popular legal tools for international investment protection, I examine the
MFN case law of international arbitral tribunals as a law-harmonizing
force. Recent case law in the international arbitration of investment
agreement disputes, beginning with Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain,141
highlights the attempt to harmonize investors’ rights and reaffirms the
quasi-multilateral aspect of BITs. First, I analyze the Maffezini case and
the reactions it provoked in the international economic law community,
and then draw several conclusions about the future implications of the
BIT regime.

137. See Nigel Blackaby, Arbitration Under Bilateral Investment Treaties in Latin
America, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA 379, 387–412 (Nigel
Blackaby ed., 2002) (examining commonalities among the BIT drafts of Latin American
countries).
138. But see Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITS Really Work?: An
Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 67, 89–90 (2005) (noting that “the formulas used to determine compensation in recent treaties vary from country to country”).
139. A typical MFN clause reads: “[e]ach Party shall accord to investors of the other
Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investors
of any non-Party with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management,
conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory . . . .” 2004
U.S Model BIT, supra note 43, art. 4.
140. See LOWENFELD, supra note 36, at 397–403 (discussing the role of the MFN rule
in international economic law as an element of BITs).
141. Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID (W. Bank) No. ARB/97/97 (Jan. 25,
2000) (Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction), available at http://icsid.
worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=
DC565_En&caseId=C163 [hereinafter Maffezini Decision on Jurisdiction].
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On July 18, 1997, Emilio Agustín Maffezini, an Argentine investor and
a national of the Argentine Republic, sent a request to the ICSID142 for
arbitration against the Kingdom of Spain regarding his investment in an
enterprise named EAMSA, which was to produce and distribute chemical
products in the Spanish region of Galicia.143 Maffezini subscribed to
seventy percent of the capital, while the Sociedad para el Desarrollo
Industrial de Galicia (“SODIGA”), a Spanish entity, subscribed to the
remaining thirty percent.144 Both Maffezini and SODIGA used private
research to evaluate the project before investing in it.145 Nevertheless,
roughly two years after the initial investment was made, EAMSA began
experiencing financial difficulties, its construction stopped, and EAMSA’s
employees were dismissed.146 Attempts were made to raise capital and to
secure loans and subsidies in order to avoid financial failure, but most of
these efforts were fruitless.147
Consequently, Maffezini instituted an ICSID proceeding against the
Spanish government.148 Maffezini based his claim on the provisions of
the 1991 Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment between the Kingdom of Spain and the Argentine Republic
(“Argentina-Spain BIT”).149 I will now examine Maffezini’s arguments
to understand his grounds for filing the ICSID claim.
Maffezini alleged that the project failed because of SODIGA’s poor
advice regarding the costs of the project, as the costs turned out to be
significantly greater than predicted.150 Furthermore, according to Maffezini, SODIGA forced EAMSA to start its operations before an environmental impact assessment had cleared, causing EAMSA to incur additional unforeseen costs.151 Maffezini asserted that SODIGA is, in fact, a
Spanish public entity, and thus, all of SODIGA’s acts and omissions are
attributable to Spain, thereby allowing him to sue Spain in an international arbitral tribunal under the Argentina-Spain BIT.152
142. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
143. Maffezini Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 141, ¶¶ 1, 65.
144. Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID (W. Bank) No. ARB/97/97 (Nov. 13,
2000), ¶ 39 (Arbitral Award), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet
?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC566_En&caseId=C163 [hereinafter Maffezini Award].
145. Id. ¶¶ 40–41.
146. Id. ¶¶ 42–43.
147. Id.
148. Id. ¶¶ 43–44.
149. Id. ¶ 4; Maffezini Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 141, ¶ 1.
150. Maffezini Award, supra note 144, ¶ 44.
151. Id.
152. Id.; Maffezini Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 141, ¶ 72.
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The ICSID tribunal sustained most of Maffezini’s claims, and on November 9, 2000, determined that the total amount of compensation, including interest, Spain must pay Maffezini is about 58 million Spanish
pesetas.153 However, the January 25, 2000, preliminary decision of the
tribunal on objections to jurisdiction received much more attention in the
international economic law community,154 and indeed, constitutes the
heart of this Article’s discussion of the Maffezini case.
Spain challenged the jurisdiction of the ICSID tribunal and its competence, among other defensive arguments, on the ground that Maffezini
failed to comply with the requirements of Article X of the ArgentinaSpain BIT, which deals with the exhaustion of domestic remedies.155 The
Argentina-Spain BIT requires an eighteen-month waiting period before
an investor can submit his or her claims to arbitration; during this period,
domestic courts have the opportunity to dispose of a dispute.156 Maffezini
submitted his claim before the expiration of this period.157
While the tribunal found that Maffezini failed to comply with Article
X of the Argentina-Spain BIT, this was not dispositive.158 Maffezini argued in the alternative that he has the right to rely on the MFN clause
contained in the Argentina-Spain BIT.159 Like similar investment treaties,
Article IV of the Argentina-Spain BIT states: “[i]n all matters subject to
this Agreement, this treatment shall not be less favorable than that extended by each Party to the investments made in its territory by investors
of a third country.”160 Using the MFN clause in the Argentina-Spain BIT,
Maffezini invoked the provisions of a 1991 BIT between the Republic of
Chile and Spain (“Chile-Spain BIT”).161 Article 10(2) of the Chile-Spain
BIT allows an investor to opt for arbitration after a six-month negotiations

153. Id. ¶¶ 35, 97.
154. See, e.g., Jürgen Kurtz, The Delicate Extension of Most-Favored-Nation Treatment to Foreign Investors: Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL
TREATIES, AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 523–55 (Todd Weiler ed., 2005); Jarrod Wong, The Application of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses to Dispute Resolution Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y
171, 181–84 (2008).
155. Maffezini Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 141, ¶ 19.
156. Id. (quoting Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Arg.-Spa., Oct. 3, 1991, art. X [hereinafter Argentina-Spain BIT]).
157. See id. ¶ 26 (“Claimant admits that the dispute was not referred to a Spanish court
prior to its submission to the [ICSID].”).
158. Id. ¶¶ 36–37.
159. Id. ¶¶ 37–38.
160. Id. ¶ 38 (quoting Argentina-Spain BIT, supra note 156, art. IV(2)).
161. Id. ¶¶ 2, 39–40.
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period has expired; it does not require an eighteen-month waiting period.162 Maffezini claimed that as Chilean investors in Spain are treated
more favorably than Argentine investors, the Argentina-Spain BIT
should be construed as giving Maffezini the option to submit the dispute
to arbitration without prior referral to domestic courts.163
Spain rebutted Maffezini’s arguments. It contended that, under international law principles, the MFN clause may only apply in respect to the
same matter and may not be extended to matters different from those
contemplated by the basic treaty.164 The MFN clause of the ArgentinaSpain BIT does not encompass questions of jurisdiction and other procedural issues, unlike the material aspects of the treatment granted to investors, as discrimination cannot take place in connection with procedural
matters.165 According to Spain, only if Maffezini showed that local courts
in Spain are less favorable to the foreign investor than is ICSID arbitration would he be able to claim that the jurisdictional question has a material effect on FDI treatment.166
Discussing the application of the MFN clause to the BIT dispute settlement mechanism, the Maffezini tribunal found that the clause did apply to procedural rights related to the mechanism, including jurisdictional
rights.167 It based its decision on the language of the BIT, the policies
that shaped the parties’ negotiation of the BIT, and the practice of the
Spanish government in concluding its BITs.168 As a result, the tribunal
held that Maffezini was entitled to the more favorable dispute settlement
terms in the Chile-Spain BIT, permitting him to submit his claim to arbitration after only six months.169
The Maffezini tribunal extended dispute settlement provisions in other
BITs without a clear reference in the MFN provision,170 since it found
that the parties did not intend to omit this reference based on their treatment of foreign investors as well as their own investors.171 However, the
162. Id. ¶ 39 (citing Agreement on the Reciprocal Protection and Promotion of Investments, Spa.-Chile, Oct. 2, 1991, art. 10(2)).
163. Maffezini Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 141, ¶ 40.
164. Id. ¶ 41.
165. Id.
166. Id. ¶ 42.
167. Id. ¶ 64.
168. Id. ¶¶ 43–64.
169. Id. ¶ 64. The tribunal arrived at this conclusion despite rejecting Maffezini’s jurisdictional arguments based on the Argentina-Spain BIT. See id. ¶¶ 19–37.
170. See Argentina-Spain BIT, supra note 156, art. IV(2) (“In all matters subject to
this Agreement, this treatment shall not be less favorable than that extended by each Party to the investments made in its territory by investors of a third country.”).
171. See Maffezini Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 141, ¶¶ 52–61.
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Maffezini tribunal warned that investors should not “override public policy considerations that the contracting parties might have envisaged as
fundamental conditions for their acceptance of the agreement in question.”172 Among the various examples referenced are replacing the arbitration forum chosen by the parties and exhausting local remedies.173
I now analyze the tribunal’s decision and its importance to the creation
of harmonization in international bilateral treaties. As mentioned above,
foreign direct investors seeking to protect their investments have extensively relied upon BITs’ MFN clauses in international arbitrations.174 The
MFN clause, originally one of the most important principles in international trade law, prevents a host State from discriminating among different investors from different nationalities by allowing investors to claim
more favorable protection terms granted to other investors by, inter alia,
legislation, practice, or other BITs.175
Therefore, an international arbitral tribunal’s interpretation of an MFN
clause is enormously important in defining the coverage of investment
protection under BITs. Moreover, since most of the MFN clauses in BITs
are drafted using the same language, as previously noted,176 each decision related to the MFN clause has a powerful impact on the interpretation and drafting of many other BITs. While international arbitrators are
not bound by previous decisions made by other international tribunals,177
arbitral tribunals respect these decisions and integrate their reasoning
into their own judgments and awards.178
BITs also offer a limited number of investors’ rights, and these have
been developed over the years by international economic law and practice and have been influenced by FDI trends.179 Accordingly, the MFN
clause, which serves as the practical mechanism for investment protection, can be, in fact, a law-harmonizing tool.180 By forcing different
172. Id. ¶ 62.
173. See id. ¶ 63.
174. See LOWENFELD, supra note 36, at 397–403.
175. Most treaties extend the MFN treatment to a wide range of economic activities.
See, e.g., 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 43, art. 4.
176. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
177. For a discussion on precedents in international arbitration law in the context of
investment disputes, see PETROCHILOS, supra note 87.
178. See Todd Weiler, NAFTA Article 1105 and the Principles of International Economic Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 35 (2003) (making the case for the application
of international economic law principles even across various international legal institutions).
179. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
180. See Scott Vesel, Clearing a Path Through a Tangled Jurisprudence: Most-FavoredNation Clauses and Dispute Settlement Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 32
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countries to converge on similar standards in international investment
protection, the MFN clause, if widely applied, can increase the level of
law-harmonization in the FDI realm.181
Following the Maffezini decision, one would expect to see international arbitral tribunals explicitly adopting or rejecting its broad interpretation of the MFN clause. Adoption of the Maffezini approach, like the decision itself, will signal the continued expansion and harmonization of
protections for international investors against host States. Alternatively,
highlighting the limitations of the Maffezini decision can suggest a balance between protection for international investors and the interests of
host States.
It appears that current ICSID jurisprudence is endorsing the Maffezini
decision, further harmonizing international investors’ protections. In
Siemens, A.G. v. Argentine Republic,182 another ICSID decision, the tribunal followed Maffezini and concluded that it had jurisdiction over
Siemens’ claims against Argentina, although the Germany-Argentina
BIT required a waiting period of eighteen months.183 Like the claimant in
Maffezini, Siemens invoked the MFN provision in this BIT to avoid waiting eighteen months and submitted the claim directly to the ICSID, as the
Argentina-Chile BIT does not contain such a requirement.184 The Siemens tribunal was convinced that the dispute settlement mechanism—
access to ICSID arbitration—is among investors’ protections under the
Germany-Argentina BIT.185 The Siemens decision also cites the policy
restrictions expounded in Maffezini.186
Two other cases have followed the Maffezini and Siemens rationale, allowing investors from Luxembourg and Spain to immediately commence
an ICSID arbitration against Argentina during the eighteen-month waiting period required by the respective BITs.187 The tribunals in both cases,
YALE J. INT’L. L. 125, 142 (2007) (citing several scholars who identify the MFN clause as
a law-harmonization tool).
181. See id.
182. Siemens, A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) No. ARB/02/8 (Aug. 3,
2003) [hereinafter Siemens Decision on Jurisdiction].
183. Id. ¶¶ 79–110.
184. Id. ¶ 32.
185. Id. ¶¶ 94–103. The Siemens decision suggests an alternative to the classic view of
the dispute-settlement mechanism as a procedural rights provider; the classical view is
embodied by the Salini and Plama cases, which are discussed in detail later in this Article. See infra notes 201, 208.
186. Id. ¶¶ 75, 109, 120.
187. See Camuzzi Int’l S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) No. ARB/03/7
(May 11, 2005), available at http://www.asil.org/pdfs/cvajd050614.pdf [hereinafter Camuzzi Decision on Jurisdiction]; Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
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Camuzzi International S.A. v. Argentine Republic and Gas Natural SDG,
S.A. v. Argentine Republic, emphasized the notion that procedural arbitration provisions in BITs are a significant substantive incentive and
source of protection for foreign investors; thus, unless it appears that the
parties agreed to another method of dispute resolution, the MFN principle should be broadly construed to embrace dispute resolution provisions.188 Camuzzi and Gas Natural reinforced the function that the MFN
principle plays in the harmonization of international investment law.
Nevertheless, recent negotiations over the Central America-Dominican
Republic Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA-DR”)189 fascinatingly reveal
the complex role of the Maffezini decision in international forums. The
CAFTA-DR, based on the North American Free Trade Agreement
(“NAFTA”), aims to promote trade liberalization among the United
States, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, and
the Dominican Republic.190 This agreement is part of the current trend in
international trade law: a proliferation of bilateral and regional trade
agreements that contain a separate investment chapter.191 The U.S. government, for instance, has recently signed such agreements with Chile
and Singapore.192
The final draft of the CAFTA-DR sheds light on the parties’ ostensible
intention to reject the Maffezini interpretation of the MFN clause. It limits the reach of the MFN clause to matters “with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale
or other disposition of investments,”193 excluding from the scope of the
MFN clause procedural and jurisdictional questions related to the dispute
resolution mechanism. In fact, a footnote in the CAFTA-DR draft expli-

(W. Bank) No. ARB/03/10 (June 17, 2005), available at http://www.asil.org/pdfs/Gas
Nat.v.Argentina.pdf [hereinafter Gas Natural Decision on Jurisdiction].
188. Camuzzi Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 187, ¶¶ 131–34; Gas Natural Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 187, ¶ 49.
189. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States of America Free Trade
Agreement, Aug. 5, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/
CAFTA/CAFTA-DR_Final_Texts/Section_Index.html [hereinafter CAFTA-DR].
190. Id.
191. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
192. Some of those agreements, such as the U.S.-Chile FTA, include an investment
chapter based on the NAFTA model incorporating post-NAFTA case law, while other
agreements are accompanied by negotiations on separate investment agreements, such as
the recent U.S.-Uruguay Bilateral Investment Treaty. See U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 85;
U.S.-Uruguay BIT, supra note 86.
193. See Organization of American States, Foreign Trade Information System, Central
America Free Trade Agreement Draft, art. 10.4, Jan. 24, 2004, available at http://www.sice.
oas.org/TPD/USA_CAFTA/Jan28draft/Chap10_e.pdf [hereinafter CAFTA Draft].
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citly states that the MFN clause “does not encompass international dispute resolution mechanisms such as those contained in Section C of this
Chapter, and therefore could not reasonably lead to a conclusion similar
to that of the Maffezini case.”194 The parties agreed to include this footnote in the “negotiation history” of the Agreement, even though the footnote was to be deleted from the final text.195
The CAFTA-DR is a notable example of a regional trade and investment agreement that does not follow the legal language of many similar
agreements on some significant issues in the investment protection chapter.196 Among these variations are provisions for greater transparency in
the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism, and for an appeal mechanism for investor-state arbitration.197 It will be interesting to see
whether the CAFTA-DR represents the beginning of a new trend, and
whether future BITs will offer a variety of investment protection models,
thereby increasing the competitiveness of the BIT as an international legal instrument.198 Other arbitral tribunals might reject Maffezini, perhaps
influenced by the CAFTA-DR approach199 as well as some host States’
criticism of Maffezini.200 If they do so, it might result in conflicting views
on what qualifies as a case matter before a given tribunal.
In fact, several recent ICSID decisions have explicitly criticized the
Maffezini decision, expressing an unwillingness to extend the MFN
clause to dispute settlement mechanisms and other procedural elements
of investment protection treaties. However, a careful review of these decisions suggests that they are exceptions to the general rationale of Maffezini, giving effect to the public policy caveat raised by the Maffezini
tribunal. In the recent case of Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Hashemite

194. Id. art. 10.4 n.1. This footnote was not included in the 2004 U.S. Model BIT; it is
therefore unclear if the United States intends to integrate it into any future BIT. See Mark
A. Cymrot, Investment Disputes with China, 61-OCT. DISP. RESOL. J. 80, 83 n.20 (2006).
195. Id.
196. See David A. Gantz, Settlement of Disputes Under the Central AmericaDominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement, 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 331, 344–86 (2007).
197. See id. at 379–80, 386.
198. As the investment chapter of the CAFTA Draft incorporates provisions similar to
those of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, we need to examine if other States will follow this
model, which offers a more protective and limited version of investors’ regulations. Japan, for example, tends to focus on investment liberalization. See Japan Grows Positive
on Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 116, at 3.
199. For a discussion of CAFTA-DR, see supra notes 189–98 and accompanying text.
200. See Bernardo M. Cremades, Disputes Arising out of Foreign Direct Investment in
Latin America: A New Look at the Calvo Doctrine and Other Jurisdictional Issues, 59JUL. DISP. RESOL. J. 79, 82 (2004).
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Kingdom of Jordan,201 an ICSID tribunal considered an argument made
by Salini, an Italian investor in Jordan, that the tribunal should have jurisdiction over contractual claims based on the MFN clause found in the
Italy-Jordan BIT.202 Salini claimed that U.S. and U.K. investors in Jordan
enjoyed a more favorable dispute settlement mechanism than did Salini,
since the U.S.-Jordan and U.K.-Jordan BITs provide for ICSID jurisdiction over contractual claims, whereas Article IX of the Italy-Jordan BIT
sends contractual claims to local Jordanian courts.203 According to this
argument, the MFN provision should offer Italian investors the same
procedural treatment available to U.S. and U.K. nationals.204
However, the tribunal concluded that the Italy-Jordan BIT cannot be
applied to the dispute settlement process, and distinguished MFN provisions that expressly include dispute settlement in their language from
provisions that do not.205 The Salini tribunal was aware of the Maffezini
caveat, which states that interpretations of MFN clauses should not
overwhelm public policy concerns, such as honoring the intent of the
parties that drafted the BIT or other existing principles of BIT interpretation.206 Nevertheless, the Salini tribunal was unconvinced that the public
policy caveat of the Maffezini tribunal can prevent investors from exploiting varying MFN provisions by “treaty shopping,” as investors can
operate in the country with the most favorable dispute settlement mechanism in its BIT.207
Another recent ICSID case, Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of
Bulgaria,208 followed the rationale of the Salini decision, asserting that
“the MFN provision of the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT cannot be interpreted as
providing consent to submit a dispute under the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT to
ICSID arbitration . . . .”209 In this case, Plama, a Cypriot investor,
claimed that the MFN provision effectively permits replacement of the
Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT’s dispute resolution mechanism—ad hoc interna-

201. Salini Construttori S.p.A. v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID (W. Bank)
No. ARB 02/13 (Nov. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Salini Decision on Jurisdiction].
202. Id. ¶ 17.
203. Id. ¶ 36.
204. Id.
205. The MFN clause in question was silent on its application to the dispute settlement
mechanism. See id. ¶ 66 (quoting Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Italy.-Jord., July 21, 1999, art. 3).
206. Id. ¶ 113.
207. Id. ¶ 115.
208. Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID (W. Bank) No.
ARB/03/24 (Feb. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Plama Decision on Jurisdiction].
209. Id. ¶ 184.
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tional arbitration for compensation purposes only—with arbitration before the ICSID, as provided in the Bulgaria-Finland BIT.210
The Plama tribunal pointed out that the circumstances in Maffezini
were exceptional, as the Maffezini tribunal had to find a way to avoid
applying a nonsensical provision requiring domestic remedies to be pursued in local courts during the first eighteen months before the dispute
could be submitted to the ICSID.211 The Plama tribunal criticized the
Maffezini decision, along with two decisions that it considered to be incorrectly based on Maffezini,212 for articulating a general rule and then
qualifying it with multiple public policy exceptions.213 The Plama tribunal recommended that the MFN provision be applied to the dispute
settlement mechanism only when it is supported by the clear language of
the BIT between the parties and their specific intent.214 A treaty’s historical context or any other parol evidence is insufficient to authorize a
broader interpretation of an MFN provision.215
Further, the Plama tribunal questioned the way the Maffezini tribunal
treated the harmonization of international standards: “[it failed] to see
how harmonization of dispute settlement provisions can be achieved by
reliance on the MFN provision.”216 The tribunal described as “chaotic”
and counterproductive to harmonization the phenomenon where an investor can use an MFN provision to cherry-pick a dispute settlement
provision from one of the other BITs to which the host State is party.217
According to this analysis, host States might find themselves exposed to
several dispute settlement mechanisms to which they have not necessarily agreed.218
To summarize, some international arbitral decisions tend to follow the
Maffezini wave, extending the MFN provision and harmonizing international arbitration law standards,219 whereas a few others avoid this path,
restricting MFN coverage of dispute resolution provisions to those cases
where the parties’ intention to embrace this construction is made clear
210. Id. ¶ 183.
211. Id. ¶ 224.
212. Id. ¶ 226 (discussing Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank)
No. ARB/02/08 (Aug. 3, 2004); Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed v. United Mexican
States, ICSID (W. Bank) No. ARB(AF)/00/2 (May 29, 2003)).
213. See Plama Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 208, ¶ 224.
214. Id. ¶¶ 204, 218.
215. See id. ¶ 223.
216. Id. ¶ 219.
217. Id.
218. See id.
219. See, e.g., Siemens Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 182; Camuzzi Decision on
Jurisdiction, supra note 187; Gas Natural Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 187.
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through express language.220 While acknowledging these different approaches to interpreting BIT provisions, several scholars have pointed
out that the general principles of Maffezini are still widely accepted when
parties give their basic consent to ICSID jurisdiction.221 This lively debate, which is taking place in several international arbitration forums,222
reveals how the MFN clause can be used as a law-harmonizing tool in
international investment arbitration.
In this context, it is worth mentioning that commentators increasingly
call for a more harmonized approach towards international arbitration,
including its classical aspects such as advocacy.223 Arbitrators must be
sensitive in the way they interpret rights and certain obligations, for their
decisions contribute to the law of international investment arbitration.224
In any case, embodying “multilateralist bilateralism,” Maffezini and other
decisions that followed it demonstrate the impact of international investment arbitration case law on the harmonization of investment regulation.
C. The Need for a Future Multilateral Agreement: Implications
To this day, multilateral forums have failed to develop a common approach towards an MAI. The United Nations, the OECD, and now the
WTO have struggled to separate investment issues from the general discussion on North-South economic integration,225 leaving countries to negotiate investment treaties on bilateral and regional levels. Any discussion on the prospects for a future MAI must take into account the foregoing analysis of the multilateral aspect of BITs, and the fundamental
questions that arise: is a multilateral agreement even necessary when one
can identify an effective network of more than 2200 BITs? And even if

220. See, e.g., Salini Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 201; Plama Decision on
Jurisdiction, supra note 208.
221. See, e.g., Egli, supra note 127, at 1077–78 (addressing the inconsistency in applying the MFN provision in international investment law); Vesel, supra note 180, at 169–
81.
222. The ICSID is the leading institution where this discussion is occurring.
223. See R. Doak Bishop, Toward a Harmonized Approach to Advocacy in International Arbitration, in THE ART OF ADVOCACY IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 451 (R.
Doak Bishop ed., 2004).
224. For example, note the dialogue between the Siemens tribunal and the Maffezini
tribunal. See supra notes 182–86 and accompanying text.
225. Developed and developing countries have been negotiating several legal instruments that aim to increase the exchange of investment and trade inflows in both, while
advancing sustainable development in the latter’s economies, especially during the transition period of this integration. See generally Ostry, supra note 57, at 285.
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an MAI is still found necessary, how will the BIT network impact the
development and evolution of an MAI?
Several commentators have called for the establishment of a World Investment Organization226 to serve as a platform for multilateral negotiations on investment issues, and as an enforcement forum similar to the
Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) of the WTO.227 Avi-Yonah argues, for
example, that the only suitable forum to discuss serious international
investment dilemmas is a multilateral one where both developed and developing countries have legitimate representation.228 Both UNCTAD and
the OECD suffer from a substantial bias towards various interest groups.229
Although the WTO could have been an appropriate forum, linking trade
and investment would undermine the credibility of the WTO negotiation
process as the principal forum for world trade issues, as well as the
DSB.230 The proposed World Investment Organization would benefit
from a narrower mission.
The development of the BIT network supports such an argument. As
discussed above, BITs grant investors limited rights that focus mainly on
antidiscrimination and compensation in the event of expropriation.231 The
enforcers of BITs—international arbitral tribunals—can help promote
investment liberalization without becoming implicated in distinct international economic principles such as trade.232 A future multilateral in-

226. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up,
Down, and Sideways, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1781 (2000) (theorizing the establishment of
such an institution for international antitrust purposes).
227. The DSB was founded as part of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in order to institutionalize and expand the dispute settlement mechanism of the GATT. See
Faten Sabry, The Development and Effectiveness of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body,
10 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 521, 523–28 (2001) (providing an overview of the development
of the DSB).
228. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 20, at 31–34.
229. Traditionally, UNCTAD advances the interests of the developing world, while the
OECD furthers the welfare of industrialized States. About UNCTAD, supra note 132;
OECD, About OECD, http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_
1_1_1,00.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2009).
230. For a discussion of the WTO’s legitimacy as a result of several attempts to extend
its limited agenda, see Robert Howse, The Legitimacy of the World Trade Organization,
in THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 355–407 (J. Coicaud & V.
Heiskanen eds., 2001).
231. See Vandevelde, supra note 15, at 506–14.
232. On the legitimacy of investors’ claims when they also have an impact on trade,
see Todd Weiler & Thomas W. Wälde, Investment Arbitration Under the Energy Charter
Treaty in the Light of New NAFTA Precedents: Towards a Global Code of Conduct for
Economic Regulation, 1 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1, ¶ 6 (2004), available at http://www.
transnational-dispute-management.com/samples/freearticles/tv1-1-article_51.htm.
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vestment forum, which would adopt such a disciplined approach to investment regulation and enforcement, is more likely to produce an MAI
with the support of both investors and host States.233 While NGOs consistently fight against multilateral economic forums that seem to be dominated by industrialized countries or Western capitalist interests,234 the
case of the extensive and evenly spread BIT network demonstrates an
acceptable legal framework.
However, given the relatively harmonious character of this network,
the added value of a future MAI to the process of refining an international investment regulatory framework remains an open question. Although
any potential MAI will not necessarily threaten the BIT network, the limited, additional value of an MAI may not justify the utilization of precious resources and the foreseeable annulment or adaptation of existing
bilateral treaties. The preservation of the current BIT network helps sustain the fine balance among the interests of multiple parties and reflects a
consensus in state practice.
A multilateral agreement under the umbrella of a putative World Investment Organization would monitor States’ compliance with investment regulation more effectively.235 Similarly, a permanent investment
tribunal would promote consistency in investment jurisprudence, offering
a comprehensive, cohesive interpretation of the MAI, thereby preventing
conflicting decisions by a multitude of investment tribunals.236 When a
State faces a financial crisis that has a significant impact on several industries and many companies, numerous claims are concurrently submitted
to numerous investor-state tribunals, but raise similar legal questions.237

233. Cf. Kurtz, supra note 9, at 779–88 (suggesting a similar model for a future multilateral investment agreement in the WTO). The 2004 U.S. Model BIT is a possible prototype for a future MAI. See 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 43.
234. See Robert Howse, Trade Negotiations and High Politics: Drawing the Right
Lessons from Seattle, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROBERT E. HUDEC, supra note 57, at 430.
235. In 2004, UNCTAD created a database of BITs on its website. See UNCTAD,
Investment Instruments Online, http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Page____1006.aspx
(last visited Jan. 16, 2009).
236. For a discussion on the proliferation of new bodies charged with resolving international disputes, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 191, 194 (2003).
237. The multiple investment arbitration cases in various international tribunals related
to the 2001 financial crisis in Argentina are a highly fitting example. See Jurgen Kurtz,
Adjusting the Exceptional at International Law: Security, Public Order and Financial
Crisis 12–13 (Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 06/08, 2008), available at http://www.
jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/08/080601.doc (reviewing the Argentine financial crisis
of 2001 and the litigation proceedings in its aftermath).
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Such scenarios can result in multiple inefficient decisions,238 inconsistent
findings on similar financial facts, and a lack of political power to enforce these decisions separately. For instance, following the financial
crisis in Argentina in 2001, investors simultaneously brought their claims
against Argentina to the ICSID and other tribunals, pursuant to the relevant provisions in the BITs between Argentina and investors’ home
States.239 The separate cases repeatedly scrutinized the same 2001 Argentine legislation enacted after the currency crisis in the local market.240
A consolidation of claims arising from the same financial crisis or similar pattern of state behavior will help arbitrators gain a better understanding of the crisis or state conduct, its scope and implications, in addition to saving time and litigation costs. The decisions of investor-state
arbitral tribunals in consolidated cases will have a stronger political power, which is still needed to enforce the award against the host government, despite the legally binding effect of arbitral judgments.241 In international law, it is generally difficult to enforce awards and other obligations against governments, and investor-state arbitration provides a useful illustration.242 Argentina, for example, constantly ignored international obligations, such as repaying International Monetary Fund (“IMF”)

238. Compare, e.g., Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) No. ARB/01/12
(Dec. 8, 2003) [hereinafter Azurix Decision on Jurisdiction], with CMS Gas Transmission
Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) No. ARB/01/8 (July 17, 2003) [hereinafter
CMS Decision on Jurisdiction]. In both cases, the tribunals, while upholding shareholders’ direct right of action, rejected Argentina’s argument that the investor lacked standing
to pursue a claim under the U.S.-Argentina BIT, because Argentina was not a party to the
contract that was the subject of the state action about which the investor complained. See
Azurix Decision on Jurisdiction, supra, ¶ 57; CMS Decision on Jurisdiction, supra, ¶¶ 53–
56.
239. For the significance of the claims against Argentina based on the Argentine financial crisis in 2001, see UNCTAD, International Investment Disputes On the Rise 1–2,
UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/ITT/2004/2 (Nov. 29, 2004) (showing that of 106 investment cases
pending in the ICSID in November 2004, thirty-four were such claims).
240. See generally MARK WEISBROT & DEAN BAKER, WHAT HAPPENED TO ARGENTINA?
(2002) (discussing the reasons for and implications of the 2001 Argentine financial crisis).
241. See THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AND THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS RESOLUTION: A STUDY BY THE PANEL ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (David D. Caron & John R. Crook eds.,
2000).
242. On enforceability in international arbitration, see generally DOMENICO DI PIETRO
& MARTIN PLATTE, ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AWARDS—THE NEW
YORK CONVENTION OF 1958 (2001).
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loans, though the loan agreements were absolutely valid.243 Although
governments have, for the most part, respected the arbitral awards of international investor-state tribunals, this practice could change dramatically due to many governments’ growing protectionism and their increasing
lack of trust in international tribunals.244 Of course, a consolidated procedure should not prevent the tribunal from granting different awards to
different investors, based on variation in the extent of damages suffered.
Moreover, if an MAI is ultimately unfeasible, the structural problem discussed above—multiple, fragmented arbitrations arising from common
events—should be avoided through the negotiation and drafting of future
BITs.245 The class action common in U.S. civil procedure might be a
helpful model in this context as well.246
Not every aspect of investment regulation can be analyzed solely on
the bilateral level. Where unilateral or bilateral investment regulations
have externalities and impact other countries, there is a need for coordination through multilateral agreement. For this reason, most commentators believe that multilateral agreements will regulate international antitrust or international tax in a more effective way.247
Of course, bilateral agreements do have distinct advantages for their
signatories, which should be considered in the negotiation of future multilateral agreements. Bilateral forums can allow parties to tailor models
to their own needs. Common variations include, inter alia: protective
conditions on foreign investment before it is accepted by the host State
(the pre-admission model) versus protective conditions only after it has

243. See The Insouciant Debtor, ECONOMIST, June 3, 2004, available at http://www.
economist.com/surveys/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_NSDQVNS (addressing the economic situation in Argentina following the declaration of default on IMF bank loans).
244. For example, following the tribunal’s award in the case of Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) No. ARB/97/4 (Dec. 29,
2004), the Slovak Republic publicly refused to pay the record award, although it ultimately settled this award payment with the investor directly. See Slovak Republic Agrees
to Pay 800 Million+ Claim, INVESTMENT L. & POL’Y NEWS BULL. (Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev.), Feb. 22, 2005, at 5–6, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment_
investsd_feb22_2005.pdf.
245. See Eloïse Obadia, ICSID, Investment Treaties and Arbitration: Current and
Emerging Issues, CEPMLP, Jan. 25, 2002, available at www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/journal/
html/vol10/article10-8.html (recommending that all cases be sent to the same tribunal, as
the current models do not allow joint claimants).
246. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
247. See Daniel Shaviro, Some Observations Concerning Multi-Jurisdictional Tax
Competition for an Analysis of International Tax Coordination, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Daniel C. Esty &
Damien Geradin eds., 2001).

2009]

THE FUTURE OF BITs

339

been accepted by the host State (the post-admission model);248 exclusion
of certain investors or industries from protection under the treaty; or even
the inclusion of dispute settlement mechanisms that emulate certain legal
traditions, usually those of the home country. For example, as a result of
Israel’s security policy, which prevents foreign investors with hostile
motives from entering the Israeli market, its model BIT bars foreign investors from State A who control entities in State B from bringing investor-state claims against Israel under a BIT between State B and State
C.249 Similarly, France excludes foreign investors from obtaining controlling ownership in the French film industry in order to protect French hegemony over its culture.250 Recent U.S. BIT negotiations raised the possibility of including an appellate procedure in investor-state dispute settlement, in response to internal political pressures to pursue such an objective.251 Although some of these variations can be accommodated
through restrictions in and reservations to a future MAI, most of them are
essentially bilateral in nature, and therefore cannot be integrated into a
multilateral instrument.
Moreover, negotiations on multilateral agreements tend to be conducted by political blocks that share common interests.252 The interests
are definitely not identical, though. Disagreements among some developed countries during the negotiations on an MAI at the OECD in 1998
illustrate variation within what seemed at the time to be a homogeneous
group.253 While the multilateral dynamic empowers unified groups and
248. See, e.g., Japan Grows Positive on Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 116,
at 3 (discussing the differences between the U.S. and Japanese approaches with respect to
the pre-admission and post-admission models).
249. See Israel Ministry of Finance, Israel 2004 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty,
available at http://www.mof.gov.il/beinle/beinfr_eng.htm.
250. In fact, the disagreement between the French film industry and the Motion Picture
Association of America was one of the factors behind the collapse of the Multilateral
Agreement on Investment. See JOOST SMIERS, ARTISTIC EXPRESSION IN A CORPORATE
WORLD: DO WE NEED MONOPOLISTIC CONTROL? 26 (2004), available at http://www.
culturelink.org/news/members/2004/Smiers_Artistic_Expression.pdf.
251. See, e.g., 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 43; U.S.-Uruguay BIT, supra note 86.
252. Thus, for example, the MAI negotiations in 1998 were mainly facilitated through
negotiations between the block of developed countries and the block of developing countries, known as the G-22. See Muchlinski, supra note 5, at 1033 (describing the failure of
the negotiations following rifts between these political blocks).
253. The United States, Canada, and EU Member States disagreed on several critical
issues. For example, France and Canada wanted to include a general exception for culture
in the MAI, while the United States challenged this proposal; similarly, the United States
rejected the EU’s proposal to include a general exception for regional economic organizations. For a detailed analysis of these and other disagreements in the MAI negotiations,
see Peter T. Muchlinski, The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment:
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fosters international concessions, it can never completely address the
needs of individual States within the blocks. Bilateral agreements can
better reflect the unique interests of the various parties. In addition, enforcement mechanisms between States can sometimes be more effective,
as the parties usually negotiate economic agreements on a repetitive basis.254
In sum, the current BIT movement maintains a unique, sensitive status
quo between home and host States and serves as a de facto MAI. The
BIT network can be a reliable long-term solution, while an MAI is unlikely to be signed in the near future. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier,
the implementation of BITs is fraught with several structural problems,
including the inconsistent interpretation of treaty language and a multiplicity of arbitral decisions on similar fact patterns, and lacks a strong institutional element. Thus, the international community should act to establish a World Investment Organization to develop, execute, and monitor an MAI based on a credible, legal, and diplomatic consensus, and
supported by the BIT network.
An intermediate solution is for BITs to be supervised by a multinational organization that includes a permanent arbitral or judicial tribunal255
and for all BITs to then select this institution to handle monitoring and
dispute settlement. In the absence of a multilateral agreement, States prefer to keep the jurisdictional issue to themselves as part of their bilateral
negotiation power, which makes such an arrangement unfeasible. However, most BITs already choose the ICSID as their arbitration tribunal,
and UNCTAD functions as the main monitoring authority for BITs;256
thus, the intermediate regime is already, albeit informally, in action.257
The vital role that the ICSID mechanism plays in investment treaties and

Lessons for the Regulation of International Business, in FOUNDATIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 114, 129–31 (Fletcher et al. eds., 2001).
254. For example, Israel and Vietnam signed an FTA in August 2004 and a double
taxation treaty in April 2008, although BIT negotiations between these countries are still
in an early stage. The application of their existing agreements will have an impact on
negotiations for a BIT, as well as its adoption and enforcement. Israel Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor, Israel-Vietnam Economic Relations, http://www.moital.gov.il/NR/
exeres/84EF90FE-5BBC-4353-A2EA-C1649C05550F.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2009).
255. A discussion of the advantages of having investor-state disputes in an arbitral,
rather than a judicial, setting is beyond the scope of this Article.
256. See About UNCTAD, supra note 132 (describing UNCTAD’s essential role in the
monitoring of BITs).
257. While there are significant differences among the various dispute settlement mechanisms, exploring such differences is beyond the scope of this Article. For an overview
of international arbitration law procedures, see PETROCHILOS, supra note 87, at 246–57.

2009]

THE FUTURE OF BITs

341

investment arbitration jurisprudence supports the view that the ICSID
can become a leading forum in a centralized BIT-monitoring process.258
D. The Establishment of Investor-State Arbitration Jurisprudence
Over the past decades, investment arbitration has become one of the
most prominent developments in international law. A strong recognition
of nonstate actors, along with the need to make individual rights enforceable, have advanced the use of the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism.259 This mechanism allows private investors to sue States directly
in international arbitral tribunals under BITs concluded between home
and host States for violations of their rights.260 Alternative dispute resolution has flourished in international commerce, with investor-state arbitration existing as an integral part of this wave.261 While the new paradigm
accepts investors or private companies as coequal newcomers to the international law community, the general principles of international arbitration, such as the requirement that the parties consent to the arbitration
procedure, are still observed.262
I have thus far identified the multilateral aspect of the BIT network and
made the case for de facto multilateral regulation through this network.263
Insofar as traditional international law draws a distinction between treaty
law and customary law,264 this novel concept of a de facto multilateral
agreement suggests that bilateral treaties are evolving into customary
international law due to their multilateral character. Given the absence of
258. It is unclear what the legal status of current bilateral agreements that reflect a de
facto multinational understanding will be once an MAI is signed. See Marie-France
Houde & Katia Yannaca-Small, Relationships Between International Investment Agreements 8–9 (OECD Working Paper No. 2004/1, 2004). A similar question has been asked
in the trade context, which can lead to a fascinating analysis. See, e.g., Paul R. Krugman,
Is Bilateralism Bad?, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND TRADE POLICY (Elhanan Helpman &
Assaf Razin eds., 1991). However, it should be noted that a trade perspective is inherently different from an investment framework and any analysis must carefully identify
which features and concepts are, in fact, compatible between the two.
259. See Weiler & Wälde, supra note 232, ¶ 122.
260. See Investor-State Dispute Settlement, supra note 130.
261. See International Investment Disputes on the Rise, supra note 239 (demonstrating
that investment disputes are growing and that these disputes involve all sectors of developed and developing countries, both at the re-establishment and operational stages).
262. As discussed earlier in this Article, the Salini and Plama tribunals, in the limitations they impose upon the Maffezini doctrine, emphasize the importance of the consent
requirement to establishing the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction. See Salini Decision on
Jurisdiction, supra note 201; Plama Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 208.
263. See supra Part II.
264. See Lowenfeld, supra note 24, at 128 (referring to “the traditional classification of
international law into two categories—customary law and treaty law”).
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a de jure MAI, it is difficult to argue that comprehensive customary international law on investment would have otherwise developed. As illustrated below, this fact has a tremendous effect on the progression of investor-state arbitration jurisprudence.
The concept of investment multilateralism allows arbitral tribunals to
interpret similar terms or provisions in different BITs in the same manner. This is true both for provisions setting forth substantive rights as
well as for procedural provisions.265 Indeed, despite the fact that arbitrators are not obligated to follow other investment tribunals’ awards as
precedents, they increasingly follow substantive and procedural trends in
investment arbitration, and are influenced by the notions of investment
liberalization and international economic law’s general code of conduct.266 In addition, recent BITs, including the 2004 U.S. Model BIT,
have increased multilateral governmental intervention in this interpretation process.267
Furthermore, obligations that are widespread throughout the BIT network can be used as a regulatory framework even when no such framework exists. As Andreas Lowenfeld has demonstrated, arbitrators may
use the general BIT framework as a source of law when there is no BIT
signed between the investor’s home State and the host State, provided
that the host country has signed other BITs or has become a party to an
investor-state arbitration convention, like the Washington Convention.268
The fact that BITs do not include a concrete set of international arbitration law rules supports this view.269 Even if the host State has not signed
such bilateral treaties or conventions, the framework can still apply, pro265. Thus, ambiguous substantive concepts, such as the rapidly developing and important concept of a “national security” defense to the charge of breaching investors’ protection, can have a similar interpretation. This defense can also be applied to procedural
rights, such as the jurisdictional requirements for admission to arbitration, yielding significant substantive implications.
266. See Weiler, supra note 178 (discussing these principles in the context of NAFTA’s
requirement that the three NAFTA governments treat foreign investors in accordance
with international law).
267. The U.S.-Chile FTA, for example, provides that both the U.S. and Chilean governments have the authority to issue interpretations of the investment provisions that are
binding on arbitral tribunals. Moreover, both governments are to be involved in the ensuing litigation process. FTA partners that are not litigants in the dispute (amicus curiae)
may submit comments during litigation on the interpretation of the investment provisions.
The FTA also authorizes the tribunal to order “interim measure[s] of protection to preserve the rights of . . . disputing[] part[ies].” See U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 85, art.
10.19.
268. See Lowenfeld, supra note 24, at 128–30 (showing that BITs can constitute a
modern model of international customary law).
269. See PETROCHILOS, supra note 87, at 246–57.
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vided that the State has never rejected the principles embodied in the BIT
network.270 From this point of view, legal obligations that have been accepted by a large number of States for a long period of time will become
part of customary international economic law and fill the multilateral
regulation gap.271 However, it is important to note that the BIT framework cannot be used as a source of regulation when the host country has
not given its consent to the particular arbitration procedure.272 In keeping
with the fact that arbitrators can and do use other BITs as a source of
substantive legal obligations and look to awards given by other arbitral
tribunals interpreting a variety of BITs, what substantive and procedural
trends can be identified?
When an investor-state arbitral tribunal examines the status of an investment, it must balance between the competing interests of investment
protection and the legislative power of the host country. This is especially true when it comes to a host country’s need to protect domestic industries and promote national economic welfare. Arbitrators consistently
feel the political tension between the obligation to comply with the BIT’s
goals, on the one hand, and the interest in maintaining the host State’s
acceptance of the tribunal’s procedure and decision, on the other.273 A
tribunal’s efforts to remain within the scope of its jurisdiction based on
the BIT’s language are crucial to the success of the process, especially
given the need for state consent to both jurisdiction and enforcement.274
Consequently, arbitrators consider the multilateral effect of their decisions in order to preserve credibility in future claims brought by investors before the same or other tribunals.275

270. See Lowenfeld, supra note 24, at 129–30.
271. Lowenfeld himself is aware of the fact that most of the developing States do not
accept these principles from a pure sense of legal obligation, a necessary condition for
customary law; he calls for a rethinking of its traditional definition. See id.
272. Such consent is usually provided through the host State’s consent to the general
jurisdictional framework in the specific treaty. Then, the host State responds to the claim
against it when the foreign investor expresses his or her own consent and brings the case
before the appropriate tribunal. But see Chung, supra note 44, at 969–75 (discussing defiance of investment arbitration by Indonesia, Pakistan, and other developing countries
that act as host States in BITs).
273. See Kurtz, supra note 9, at 713.
274. This is tremendously important when a State is ordered to pay a huge amount of
compensation as a result of an investment dispute. See, e.g., Luke Eric Peterson, Czech
Republic Hit with Massive Compensation Bill in Investment Treaty Dispute, INVESTMENT
L. & POL’Y NEWS BULL. (Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev.), Mar. 21, 2003, at 11–12, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_investsd_march_2003.pdf
275. For a discussion on the multilateral effect of tribunals’ decisions, see, for example, Plama Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 208, ¶ 219 (discussing the consequences
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Reviewing recent developments in investment arbitration law indicates
that while tribunals do not provide investors with easy recoveries for unsound investments, investment tribunals have broadly interpreted procedural provisions in order to expand jurisdiction.276 Additionally, in terms
of substantive law, the tribunal in Mondev International Ltd. v. United
States recognized the need to protect investors beyond the minimum
standards of customary international law, following the trend of higher
standards expressed in the BIT network.277 In the Mondev case, the multilateral consensus caused the tribunal to suggest a higher level of protection.278
Arbitral tribunals have loosened many procedural requirements that
factor into jurisdictional issues in order to allow more investors to bring
claims, as discussed below. The multilateral consensus among international arbitral tribunals has shifted the sensitive balance between the need
to protect investors and the need to preserve state sovereignty towards a
more investor-friendly regime. In Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A.
v. Argentine Republic, for example, the ICSID tribunal found that according to international law, actions of a political subdivision of a State
are attributable to the central government, regardless of the State’s constitutional structure.279 This decision granted foreign investors standing
for a claim against Argentina.280 The Compañía de Aguas tribunal followed the long-standing international principle of state responsibility and
broadened the jurisdictional umbrella of the BIT.281 Moreover, it decided
that the claim could be heard even though the dispute had already been
of the Maffezini decision on the application of other treaties, and decisions by investment
tribunals).
276. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
277. See Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID (W. Bank) No. ARB(AF)/99/2
(Oct. 11, 2002), ¶ 125 [hereinafter Mondev Award] (integrating current investment law
into the traditional standards in the NAFTA Article 1105(1) context). In this case, Mondev, a Canadian real estate developer, brought a NAFTA claim against the United States
following a bank foreclosure on a shopping mall in Boston. Id. ¶¶ 1–2. The investor
claimed, inter alia, a breach of contract by the City of Boston and the Boston Redevelopment Authority. Id. ¶¶ 1, 76.
278. Id. ¶¶ 151–53.
279. Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank)
No. ARB/97/3 (Nov. 21, 2000), ¶ 49 [hereinafter Compañía de Aguas Award] (second
annulment proceeding pending).
280. Id. ¶¶ 49–55.
281. For an articulation of customary international law on state responsibility, see Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, UN
GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (adopting the report of
the International Law Commission on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts).
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brought to the national courts; the claims were not barred under collateral
estoppel because the BIT did not fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the national courts.282 As discussed earlier in the Maffezini case, the tribunal eased the exhaustion requirement, determining that the ArgentinaSpain BIT, which calls for exhaustion of Spanish domestic remedies before submitting a claim to an arbitral tribunal, was inconsistent with the
understanding of exhaustion under international law.283
The Mihaly International Corp. v. Sri Lanka decision permitted an
American company to proceed with its claim despite its partnership with
a Canadian entity that was not covered by the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction.284 Finally, the Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka A.S. v. Slovakia case recognized the possibility of bringing a claim based on continuing state behavior that commenced before the treaty entered into force,
even if the BIT’s jurisdiction is explicitly based only on behavior that
started after the treaty went into effect.285 In this case, it was unclear if
the Slovak Republic’s behavior followed the BIT’s entry into force, so
the tribunal based its jurisdiction on an older BIT that had been incorporated by reference into an agreement between the parties.286
III. INTEGRATING CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY INTO THE BIT NETWORK
Thus far, this Article has examined how the BIT network has evolved
as a “de facto” multilateral agreement, or as customary international economic law. This evolution has provided broader protection to foreign
investors and, therefore, has led us to question the very necessity of a
future MAI.287 However, developing countries and NGOs that have consistently objected to the multilateral negotiation of investment regulation
without provisions on corporate responsibility are certainly unsatisfied
282. The Compañía de Aguas tribunal reached this decision notwithstanding that the
France-Argentina BIT allowed foreign investors to choose between recourse to domestic
remedies and an ad hoc ICSID arbitration. See Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Fra.-Arg., July 3, 1991, available at http://www.unctad.
org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/france_argentina_fr.pdf.
283. Maffezini Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 141, ¶ 28.
284. Mihaly Int’l Corp. v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID (W.
Bank) No. ARB/00/2 (Mar. 15, 2002), ¶ 22.
285. See Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka A.S. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID (W. Bank)
No. ARB/97/4 (May 25, 1999), ¶¶ 43–59.
286. Id.
287. States have reacted differently to this new paradigm: while Brazil, for example, is
trying to avoid international obligations following several recent investment arbitration
decisions, Japan submitted an explanatory note regarding the accurate interpretation of its
BITs. See Noah D. Rubins, Investment Arbitration in Brazil, 4 J. WORLD INVESTMENT &
TRADE 1073, 1080–81, 1091 (2003).
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with this temporary solution.288 Indeed, drafts of BITs only include investors’ rights, while their responsibilities as nonstate actors in the international community are conspicuously absent,289 a situation that may be
traced to several factors. The inability to strike the fine balance between
corporate rights and responsibilities has repeatedly led to failures in negotiations on an MAI.290
All BIT models follow this structure and have been well respected due
to their limited objectives to promote and protect foreign investment
based on acceptable international law principles.291 Integrating corporate
responsibilities into BITs has not been considered desirable under these
circumstances. As a result of an industrialized country’s dominant position during the negotiation of a BIT, a developing country cannot negotiate the inclusion of provisions on corporate responsibility. Therefore,
only collective action will allow developing countries to negotiate regulation of corporate responsibilities. Is the BIT network as a multilateral
framework appropriate for such an endeavor? The answer appears to be
positive. I now examine this proposition and suggest different ways of
integrating corporate responsibilities into existing and future bilateral
treaties.
A discussion of the potential integration of corporate responsibilities
into the BIT network should be able to answer three core questions: First,
despite failure on the multilateral level, is the BIT network the appropriate forum for institutionalizing corporate responsibility? Second, what
responsibilities should be included in the BIT network? Third, what kind
of enforcement mechanism, if any, should the BIT network adopt with
regard to corporate responsibility?
While in the extensive scholarship on corporate responsibility there is
debate over what MNCs should be accountable for292 and how accountability can be instituted and enforced, there is also a strong normative
voice in favor of MNCs’ accountability for violations of human rights

288. See Muchlinski, supra note 5, at 1050.
289. See Sol Picciotto, Rights, Responsibilities and Regulation of International Business, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 131, 138–39 (2003).
290. On the other hand, the inclusion of several corporate responsibilities provisions in
recent U.S. BITs has raised many developing countries’ level of confidence in the U.S.
BIT program. As of this writing, Rwanda was the last developing country to sign a BIT
with the United Sates, on February 19, 2008. See List of U.S. BITs, supra note 80.
291. But see Chung, supra note 44, at 969–75.
292. See, e.g., Glen Kelley, Multilateral Investment Treaties: A Balanced Approach to
Multinational Corporations, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 483, 519–25 (2001); Picciotto,
supra note 289, at 133–39.

2009]

THE FUTURE OF BITs

347

and labor standards under international law.293 Since MNCs play an important role in the modern State, executing governmental functions either
as business partners or government agents, or through outsourcing missions,294 the line between state and nonstate actions is increasingly vague.
Several commentators have made the case for applying international human rights and international labor law obligations to MNCs and other
nonstate actors, particularly when a corporation cooperates with local
governments or performs governmental functions.295 Indeed, even when
the host State only serves as a platform for private investment activities
without jointly participating in the foreign investment or delegating governmental functions, some international legal instruments impose direct
obligations on MNCs.296
While imposing such obligations on States has raised many objections,297 regulation of foreign-investor responsibilities seems to be an
easier case. First, developing countries are worried about harmonizing
human rights and labor law, as they are afraid of losing their sovereignty
and ability to implement local policies.298 When it comes to foreign investors, intervention in local policies is less effective, especially as
MNCs can be regulated by standards other than those of the host State. If
such standards are enforced only against foreign investors in a particular
country, it might well reduce foreign investment in that country, or even
provide for a discrimination claim.299
Furthermore, the international community has traditionally punished
States that violate human rights and labor laws through trade sanctions

293. See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 461–75 (2001) (making the case for the imposition
and enforcement of corporate responsibilities under international law norms).
294. On the phenomenon of the outsourcing of services and the role of MNCs, see
World Investment Report 2004, supra note 11, at 221–33.
295. See, e.g., Ratner, supra note 293, at 497–506 (citing several cases in international
tribunals and U.S. courts that apply this approach).
296. See id. at 504–06 (applying the doctrine of superior or command responsibilities
to individual responsibility in the corporate context).
297. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions,
26 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2001).
298. For a detailed discussion of the “new imperialism,” see Christopher Wall, Human
Rights and Economic Sanctions: The New Imperialism, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 577
(1998).
299. Since the foreign investors are exposed to higher standards of local regulation in
comparison to local investors, the former can assert an MFN claim based on a BIT, and
request the abolition of such regulation.
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imposed by other States.300 These sanctions reduce the welfare of both
States (i.e., home and host) and, in many cases, are ineffective, which
tends to undermine the legitimacy of trade sanctions.301 Thus, Arie
Reich, among other scholars, has called for promoting multilateral legal
instruments and international cooperation in order to enforce international standards in a manner that raises fewer objections by the international
community than do unilateral sanctions.302 The enforcement of corporate
responsibilities in the sphere of international investment law is a desirable policy objective that should garner more of a consensus. Core international standards accepted by the majority of States would be imposed
extraterritorially on MNCs actively involved in human rights or labor
law violations, and only on these MNCs.303
An MAI, developed either within the OECD or by WTO mandate,
could be a proper venue for a binding codification of corporate responsibility provisions on four different levels: the MAI could express commitment to promoting investment in a way that is fully compatible with
human rights obligations,304 ensure that implementation does not interfere with the protection of human rights,305 include human rights organizations among its constituency,306 and lastly, provide enforcement me-

300. See Cleveland, supra note 297 (examining the current model of using economic
sanctions against States that violate human rights and international labor standards, with a
special focus on the U.S. use of sanctions).
301. Barry Carter, for example, has shown that U.S. sanctions imposed on the basis of
human rights violations have had a forty percent success rate. See BARRY E. CARTER,
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: IMPROVING THE HAPHAZARD U.S. LEGAL REGIME
233 (1988).
302. Arie Reich, Core Labor Standards and the WTO: Beware of Unilateralism!—A
Response to Werner Meng, in THE WELFARE STATE, GLOBALIZATION, AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 110, at 395–410.
303. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 20, at 25–26 (calling for extraterritorial enforcement
in the case of child labor violations).
304. OECD members, for example, examined the possibility of integrating the OECD
Guidelines for Multilateral Enterprises with the negotiated draft of the Multilateral
Agreement on Investment. See Muchlinski, supra note 5, at 1050. See also OECD, THE
OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2000), available at http://www.
oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf.
305. See KONRAD VON MOLTKE, A MODEL INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENT
FOR THE PROMOTION OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 15–17 (2004), available at http://www.
iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?pno=660 (suggesting a model that can also be implemented on the multilateral level).
306. The GATT’s agreements on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and on Technical Barriers to Trade, which use international organizations as sources
for standards and advice, could also be a model for an MAI. See Saman Zia-Zarifi, Protection Without Protectionism: Linking a Multilateral Investment Treaty and Human
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chanisms to deal with human rights violations. The MAI could thereby
gain wider political support from developing countries and the NGO
community, which would enhance the legitimacy of the agreement. Additionally, States would likely accept regulation based on the NAFTA
model to prevent a race to the bottom dynamic according to which competition for foreign investment would lower social standards.307
Yet, when several attempts were made to conclude an MAI, the developing world and the NGO community strongly objected to what, at the
time, was called the “Charter of Multinational Corporations,” an agreement that aimed to serve the interests of the international business community and the industrialized countries.308 This opposition, together with
disagreements among developed States,309 led to the systematic failure of
the negotiations, leaving the world with merely general, nonbinding declarations on corporate responsibility.310
MNCs have encountered consistent criticism of their corporate practices in developing countries since the early 1990s, which has pushed many
to adopt corporate codes of conduct.311 These codes are developed and
exercised on a voluntary basis, with the strong participation of other nonstate actors, and usually concentrate on core labor norms universally recognized by the international community.312 While some of these “codes”
are general in nature, most are specific, covering particular corporations,

Rights, in MULTILATERAL REGULATION OF INVESTMENT 101, 132–33 (E.C. Nieuwenhuys
& M.M.T.A. Brus eds., 2001).
307. See VON MOLTKE, supra note 305, at 19–20.
308. The “Charter of Multinational Corporations” refers to the draft MAI that had been
negotiated in 1998 by the developed countries, and has been perceived as an agreement
that protects only the interests of MNCs based in industrialized countries. See supra note
5.
309. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
310. See Muchlinski, supra note 253, at 114. At the same time, several NGOs have
continued to develop draft models of investment agreements that will address some of the
concerns expressed above. One of these drafts was published in April 2005 by the International Institute for Substantial Development, a well regarded Canadian research institute. See INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., MODEL INVESTMENT AGREEMENT, Apr.
2005, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment_model_int_agreement.pdf.
311. See ECOSOC, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Protection of Hum. Rts., 52d Sess., Principles Relating to the Human Rights Conduct of
Companies: Working Paper, ¶ 10 n.23, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000-WG.2/WP.1 (May
25, 2000) (prepared by David Weissbrodt) (listing several multinational corporations that
have adopted internal codes of conduct, such as 3M, Body Shop, BP Amoco, British
Telecom, C&A, Cargill, Carlson Companies, and The Gap).
312. For an overview of the codes of conduct movement, see Picciotto, supra note 289,
at 144–50.
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industries, or specific geographical areas, and as a result, they differ from
each other in terms of substance, structure, and spirit.313
Such methods of self-regulation suffer from some significant disadvantages. First, an impartial international body does not monitor compliance
with the codes,314 and third-party auditing mechanisms have often been
recognized as corruptive measures.315 Secondly, corporate codes of conduct do not include an international enforcement mechanism of any kind,
which often causes them to look merely like a public relations tool.316
The International Labor Organization (“ILO”) has been considered ineffective for the very same reason: it lacks enforcement powers.317 Furthermore, the codes’ diversity and the consistent objections they receive
from business interest groups make the chances of adopting the codes on
an international level and with legally binding effect very slim indeed.
Therefore, human rights activists, with support from various legal circles, have adopted a mixed-tools strategy: soft law regulation of corporate practices accompanied by hard law regulation, mainly through U.S.
and European tort law, the enforcement of which has brought several
high-profile MNCs to trial.318 In addition, media campaigns and consumer boycotts have led to several changes in corporate behavior.319 Legal
scholars should continue to seek international regulation of corporate
responsibility that is binding and enforceable.
The BIT network, conceptualized as a de facto multilateral agreement,
provides a unique opportunity to establish, for the first time, an international enforcement mechanism of corporate responsibilities recognized
by participating MNCs. Whereas traditional international law provides
state-to-state dispute mechanisms based on the principle of mutual con-

313. Id.
314. Id.
315. See Dara O’Rourke, Monitoring the Monitors: A Critique of Corporate, ThirdParty Labor Monitoring, in CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND LABOR RIGHTS 196 (Rhys
Jenkins et al. eds., 2002).
316. See generally Peter T. Muchlinski, Human Rights and Multinationals—Is There a
Problem?, 77 INT’L AFFAIRS 31 (2001).
317. The ILO is the U.N. agency dedicated to promoting rights at work, encouraging
decent employment opportunities, enhancing social protections, and strengthening dialogue
in work-related issues. See International Labor Organization, About the ILO, http://www.
ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/Origins_and_history/lang—en/index.htm (last visited Feb.
3, 2009) (providing an overview of the ILO’s mission and history).
318. Among those MNCs that have been brought to trial are The Gap, Nike, and Shell.
See International Labor Organization, Codes of Conduct, http://actrav.itcilo.org/actrav
english/telearn/global/ilo/code/main.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2009).
319. Boycotting Corporate America, ECONOMIST, May 26, 1990 (describing the effect
of consumers’ boycott on corporations in the United States).
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sent, the modern investor-state arbitration mechanism allows MNCs to
bring claims against States in international arbitral tribunals for violations of their rights and to seek compensation for damages.320 A mechanism that already allows nonstate actors such as MNCs to sue host States
directly should be normatively justified in imposing responsibilities on
the same MNCs, and, where appropriate, finding them accountable for
human rights violations. Modern international law recognizes the need to
grant nonstate actors rights and responsibilities, based on international
economic law and international human rights law, and supplemented by
individuals’ right to be compensated for their damages.321
Along the same lines, individuals who suffer damages as a result of
MNCs’ violations of corporate responsibilities recognized by both the
home and host countries under the BIT will be able to bring claims directly against them before an arbitral tribunal. The plaintiff would give
his or her consent to the procedure by submitting the claim to the tribunal, while the investor would manifest consent by bringing a counterclaim
against a State pursuant to a BIT.
An investor entitled to sue the host State in an investor-state tribunal
should be aware of the exposure, in the same proceeding, to a claim
based on a breach of corporate responsibilities. However, this mechanism should not be limited to a “clean hands” requirement322 in an investor-state arbitration procedure, or even to claims brought against an investor only after the investor brought an investment claim under the BIT.
BITs should explicitly state the jurisdictional ambit of such corporate
responsibility claims. The scope of the corporate responsibility protection (i.e., a “clean hands” requirement, counterclaims asserted against
investors bringing affirmative claims on the BIT, or independent claims
against corporations) will be determined based on support from corporations, governments, and the legal community.

320. See Investor-State Dispute Settlement, supra note 130.
321. For example, in addition to the ICSID, nonstate parties may appear before the
European Court of Justice, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, and the European
Court of Human Rights, subject to certain conditions. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2360 n.71 (1991) (analyzing modern
litigation in private and public international law).
322. The concept of “clean hands,” which sometimes appears in civil litigation in U.S.
courts, requires the claimant, as a prerequisite to pursuing his or her remedies, to demonstrate that he or she was not at fault; otherwise, the court is required to balance the claimant’s faults and actions. Cf. Lisa J. Laplante, The Law of Remedies and the Clean
Hands Doctrine: Exclusionary Reparation Policies in Peru’s Political Transition, 23 AM.
U. INT’L L. REV. 51, 59–64 (2007) (discussing the development of the “clean hands” doctrine in public international law).

352

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 34:2

In addition, the latest trend, establishing corporate codes of conduct,
demonstrates the importance of involving the companies in the very
process of asserting claims for breaches of corporate responsibility. It
was the concept of consent, along with the limited scope of the treaty,
that earned the investor-state arbitration mechanism of BITs wide support among both the investment community and host States. In the same
way, only core responsibilities that reflect international human rights and
labor law principles, principles broadly recognized by the international
community and MNCs, are likely to receive the support necessary to include them in future treaties.
As discussed above, several self-adopted corporate codes of conduct
provide MNCs with certification of good behavior based on monitoring
reviews, allowing them to insulate themselves against possible claims of
bad practices.323 These codes can be annexed to existing BITs to reflect
the norms on which future claims may be based.324 Associating BITs
with certain corporate codes of conduct will also help investment arbitrators determine which international corporate responsibilities should be
applied in a particular case, in light of the large number of international
nonlegally binding instruments. The recognition of the BIT network as a
de facto multilateral agreement could transform the bilateral mechanism
for FDI into a multilateral enforcement mechanism for corporate responsibilities. It will be fascinating to follow such jurisprudence as it evolves
based on classical investor-state arbitration.
Several potential drawbacks should be addressed, though. First, investor-state arbitral tribunals have traditionally been comprised of experts in
international economic law.325 It is necessary to include experts in international human rights law and international labor rights law to adjudicate
future claims against MNCs. NGOs and other international organizations
with relevant expertise can be part of the process, either during the tri-

323. For example, SA8000 is an international workplace standard with a built-in verification system. See Social Accountability International, Overview of SA8000, http://www.saintl.org/index.cfm?%20fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageId=473 (last visited Feb. 2, 2009).
SA8000 was developed by Social Accountability International and is based on international employment and workplace norms taken from the ILO Conventions, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child. Id.
Companies apply to be certified for compliance with SA8000 standards, a process that
entails independent audits. Id.
324. See Elliot Schrage, Judging Corporate Accountability in the Global Economy, 42
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 153 (2003) (discussing several ways to transform corporate
codes of conduct from “soft law” to “hard regulation”).
325. The vast majority of these experts are academics or practitioners in the field of
international economic law, with limited knowledge of international human rights law.
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bunal selection or during the hearings, duplicating the NAFTA model of
labor and environment side agreements.326
Second, the process of integrating corporate responsibility provisions
into investment treaties and implementing them is likely to be time consuming and sui generis.327 Resultantly, it will be daunting to achieve
harmonization of corporate responsibilities through the investor-state
dispute mechanism. As previously noted, multiple inefficient decisions
may result due to tribunals’ inconsistent interpretations of similar fact
patterns, and a lack of political power to enforce each decision separately. Such a challenging path is inevitable, but worthwhile, as an enforcement mechanism for international corporate responsibility would be a
seminal achievement.
CONCLUSION
The Cancún Session and the diplomatic negotiations that followed it
herald the temporary disappearance of investment regulation in the multilateral trade forum. While the prospects for renegotiating a multilateral
agreement in the near future are limited, the existing network of BITs
can serve as an effective multilateral framework for investment regulation. Evolving beyond traditional concepts of international law, BITs can
create a multilateral base through their unique MFN principle, signing
patterns, and parallel content and concepts.
This innovative notion of multilateral bilateralism offers much more
than a temporary solution for proponents of harmonization in international investment regulation. It affords arbitrators of investor-state cases
a treaty interpretation tool, regulatory framework, and point of reference
for BIT jurisprudence. While investment treaties have developed sporadically on the bilateral level for more than four decades, recent developments in international economic law call for a new multilateral regime.
The current regime empowers foreign investors politically, legally, and
economically, perpetuating inequality between developed and developing countries. Developing countries, which have thus far been extremely
reluctant to negotiate a multilateral agreement on investment, find themselves confronting a new bilateral regime that reflects their concessions
on investment protection and limits their own sovereign, legislative power.
326. See, e.g., North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
Jan. 1, 1994, (NAFTA “side agreement” on labor); North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 10(7), Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480,
1486–87 (NAFTA “side agreement” on the environment).
327. As seen in the discussion of the investors’ rights mechanism, harmonization can
develop out of a sustained dialogue between tribunals and BIT negotiators.
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Looking ahead, and acknowledging that this new regime is unlikely to
soon disappear, developing countries have a valuable opportunity to integrate corporate responsibilities into the current and future network of
BITs. Since existing BITs are typically concluded for limited terms,
many of them will be up for renewal in the coming years.328 The investor-state arbitration mechanism constitutes a credible forum in which to
balance investors’ rights with their own corporate responsibilities. Arbitral tribunals will be able to hold MNCs accountable and compensate
individual victims for violations of corporate responsibilities; in turn,
tribunals will award investors compensation for discrimination or expropriation by host States. The BIT network should go far beyond a general
declaration of corporate responsibilities, or even a “clean hands” requirement for investment claims: it should bring about a new era of tribunals empowered not only to bring justice to investors, but also to bring
investors to justice. The failures of the Doha Round can paradoxically
spawn groundbreaking progress in international investment law based on
the BIT network.

328. For example, Israel signed most of its BITs during the 1990s following the postSoviet era of investment liberalization in Eastern Europe. Almost all of these BITs have
been in force for ten or fifteen years and, thus, are up for renewal or amendment before
the end of this decade. See, e.g., Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection
of Investments, Isr.-Alb., Jan. 29, 1996 (entered into force Feb. 18, 1997).

